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INTRODUCTION

Constitutional Review of Common Law in the United States

Remember L.B. Sullivan? Sullivan, a resident of Alabama, sued
the New York Times Company for libel in an Alabama state trial court,
obtained a jury verdict there for half a million dollars damages, and
defended that verdict successfully on appeal before the state supreme
court.' The Times had published an advertisement that appeared to
accuse all of the City Commissioners of Montgomery, Alabama, of
whom Sullivan was one, of sundry unlawful and brutal deployments of
the local police against Dr. Martin Luther King and others at the height
of the civil rights confrontations in the American South. Sullivan's case
against the Times was tried under the common law of Alabama. The
Alabama courts overruled objections by the Times to certain jury
instructions that, the Times claimed, unduly widened its exposure to
* Robert Walmsley University Professor, Harvard University. This paper was prepared for
a conference celebrating the work of Owen Fiss, University of Miami, March 21-22, 2003. I am
indebted to Stephen Ellmann, Richard Fallon, Tracy-Lynn Field, Justice Kate O'Regan, Mark
Tushnet, Andr6 Van der Walt, and Johan Van der Walt for valuable comments and suggestions.
Errors are mine alone.
1. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 144 So. 2d 25 (Ala. 1962).
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liability.2
Sullivan's name lives in history because, in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, the Supreme Court of United States stripped him of his statecourt victory.3 Although Sullivan's case against the Times was one that
exuded sectional animosities bound up with the civil rights struggle, the
Warren Court had no fault to find with the honesty, accuracy, or fairness
of the state judiciary's applications of the relevant state-law precedents
in Sullivan's favor.4 Justices Brennan and company acted, rather, on a
more categorical ground: that the Alabama common-law defamation
rules were in crucial respects at odds with a clause in the national Constitution's Bill of Rights. 5
How could that possibly have been true? It had long been a fixed

point in American constitutional law that violations of the national Constitution's Bill of Rights (the Thirteenth Amendment excepted) can be
6
committed only by states and those exercising the powers of states.
L.B. Sullivan, although holding public office at the time, sued strictly as
a private citizen, for an injury to his personal reputation.7 Nevertheless,
the U.S. Supreme Court had an easy time finding state action in his case:
We may dispose at the outset of [one ground] asserted to insulate the

judgment of the Alabama courts from constitutional scrutiny ...
2. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 262-64 (1964) (describing lower courts'
rulings).
3. See id. at 292 (reversing the judgment and remanding).
4. See id. at 264 n.4 (by-passing and rejecting claims of state judicial bias and overreaching);
cf Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970) (upholding the Georgia courts' enforcement of a racist
will, but only after concluding that there was no ground to doubt that the state courts had applied
the relevant Georgia standards for will construction objectively and reasonably); id. at 439-43
("We are of the opinion that in ruling as they did the Georgia courts did no more than apply wellsettled general principles of Georgia law to determine the meaning and effect of a Georgia will.");
id. at 445 ("In the case at bar there is not the slightest indication that any of the Georgia judges
involved were motivated by racial animus or discriminatory intent of any sort in construing and
enforcing Senator Bacon's will.").
5. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 264. To be precise, the clause the Court applied was the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee against deprivations of liberty by states. By long-established
doctrine, this clause makes the First Amendment's restrictions applicable to state government.
See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925); Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 276-77.
6. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); authorities cited infra notes 74, 75.
7. Sullivan's status as a public official turned out to be a pivotal consideration in the U.S.
Supreme Court's constitutional appraisal of Alabama libel law as applied to his proceeding against
the Times. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 268 ("The question before us is whether [the state liability rule],
as applied to an action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct, abridges
the freedom of speech and of the press that is guaranteed by the first and fourteenth
amendments."); id. at 279-80 ("The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that
prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his
official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice' . . . .").
Recognition of Sullivan's public-official status did not, however, lead to any suggestion that the
latter's act of subjecting the Times to the risk of defamation liability (that is, by filing the lawsuit)
was itself an act attributable to the state.
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[T]he proposition ...that [the] Fourteenth Amendment is directed
against State action and not private action ... has no application to

this case. Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the
Alabama courts have applied a state rule of law which petitioners
claim to impose invalid restrictions on their constitutional freedoms
of speech and press. It matters not that that law has been applied in a
civil action and that it is common law only .... The test is not the

form in which state power has been applied but, whatever the form,
whether such power has in fact been exercised. 8
In other words: Who made the law that encroached unduly on free
speech? Why, Alabama did. What more state action could you want?
Is the lawmaking any less the act of Alabama because it is done by the
state's common-law judiciary instead of by the state's legislature?
The reasoning seems ironclad, especially in our post-positivist,
post-Erie age.9 It cannot, however, be accepted to the hilt without ditching the "state action" doctrine. Think of any civil action between private
parties, in which one claims the other has treated him in a manner made
unlawful by the Constitution, "the supreme law of the land."' The restaurant refused to serve me because I am black. The boss fired me without giving me reasons, or a hearing. The shopping center stifled my
political or religious speech (I was leafleting there) by having me
removed from the premises as a trespasser. In every such case - there
are no possible exceptions - the party charged with a constitutional
violation has exercised, or is pleading, some right, power, privilege, or
immunity conferred on that party either by statute or by common law.
(Were that not so, said party either would be chargeable in an ordinary
civil action with some tort, breach of contract, breach of trust, etc., or if acting as plaintiff - would lack a cause of action upon which to
sue." The Constitution would never come into play.) Hence, to open
the doors wide to judicial inspection of the common law for consistency
with the Bill of Rights is to make the "state action" barrier to constitu8. Id. at 265 (internal quotation marks omitted).
9. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) ("'[L]aw in the sense in which
courts speak of it today does not exist without some definite authority behind it. The common law
so far as it is enforced in a State, whether called common law or not, is not the common law
generally but the law of that State existing by the authority of that State without regard to what it
may have been in England or anywhere else.' ... '[T]he authority and only authority is the State,
and if that be so, the voice adopted by the State as its own [whether it be of its Legislature or of its
Supreme Court] should utter the last word.' ") (Brandeis, J.) (quoting Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co.,
215 U.S. 349, 370-372 (1910) (Holmes, J.); Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow
Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518, 532-36 (1928) (Holmes, J.)).
10. U.S. CONST. art VI.
11. See Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 28 YALE L.J. 16 (1913); Johan Van der Walt, Perspectiveson HorizontalApplication:
Du Plessis v. De Klerk Revisited, 12 SAPR/PL 1, 6, 15, 21 (1997).
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tional liability disappear. 12
But Sullivan does throw the doors open, and there is no way logically - conceptually - to push them shut. Few American lawyers
today would deny the Supreme Court's proposition in Sullivan, that the

common law's being what it is at any moment, in any state, is no less the
doing of that state than are the contents of that state's statute books.
"The common law," we all have imbibed in the first year of law school
"is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky, but the articulate voice of
some sovereign or quasi sovereign that can be identified ....,13 But
every litigation outcome necessarily turns on some claim of a right,
power, privilege, or immunity said to be established either by statute or
by common law. Plainly and inescapably, the state action doctrine is out

of business.
True enough. Nevertheless, as we all know, something persists in
our jurisprudence that walks and talks like a state action doctrine with
teeth. Take, for example, Evans v. Abney. 4 The state courts of Georgia
gave a devastatingly public effect to a testator's command to impose the
regime of Jim Crow on certain parkland to be created out of his devise to
the city of Macon. 5 On review, the U.S. Supreme Court could find no
trace of a denial by the state of the equal protection of the laws. The
Georgia courts had concluded that the will's racially discriminatory provisions were valid under - were authorized by - Georgia's general
laws of testation. The U.S. Court could find no dishonesty or other fault
12. See Johan Van der Wait, Progressive Indirect HorizontalApplication of the Bill of Rights:
Towards a Co-operative Relation between Common-law and ConstitutionalJurisprudence, 17 S.
AFR.J. Hurm. RTS. 341, 348 (2001) ("[T]he most consistent position to take would be that one can
never take the ... involvement of the state out of ... private legal relations, be these relations
founded on statutory private law or common-law private law."); Johan Van der Walt, Horizontal
Application of FundamentalRights and the Threshold of the Law in View of the Carmichele Saga,
19 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTs. 517, 536.
Note that a like jeopardy to the "state-action" doctrine is absent where the common law
doctrine subjected to constitutional review has been invoked by the state as the basis for charges
leading to punishment. See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) (reversing contempt-ofcourt conviction, based on common law, for incompatibility with constitutional protection of
freedom of expression, with no mention of any "state-action" worries; cf.S. v. Mambolo, 2001 (5)
BCLR 449 (CC), 2001 SACLR LEXIS 24 (same); Nat'l Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v.
Minister of Justice, 1998 (12) BCLR 665 (CC), 1998 SACLR LEXIS 36 (subjecting common law
doctrine defining a crime of sodomy to constitutional review).
13. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J.).
14. 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
15. The Georgia courts enforced a forfeiture to private parties of land occupied by the major
public park in the city of Macon, because the will by which the city had received the land in 1912,
as construed by the Georgia courts, made continuation of the city's title perpetually contingent on
exclusion of non-whites and the city had been barred from maintaining a racially exclusive facility
by decisions following in the wake of Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See Abney,
396 U.S. at 439; Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); New Orleans City Park Imp. Ass'n v.
Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958).
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in that determination, and neither could it see any way in which those
state laws offended against federal constitutional norms. The Georgia
laws did not prohibit racially discriminatory conditions on devises, but
neither did they require them. 6 That particular choice thus rested at the
testator's doorstep, not the state's, and that fact was deemed conclusive
against the plaintiffs' federal constitutional complaint. 7
In standard American constitutional-legal lingo, the customary way
to convey such a result is "no state action."' 8 True, one always can
recast such a decision (and no doubt more precisely) to say that of
course there has been state action - the state obviously having made
and carried out the law that gives legal force to the racist clause in the
will - but none that contravenes constitutional norms. In fact, that
comes pretty close to the Abney majority's own words, and they cited
Sullivan to boot.' 9 The careful phrasing was untypical, though. More
usually, the Court falls into loose "state action" talk to explain its decisions denying the relevance of the federal Bill of Rights to ordinary-law,
private litigation. Emblematic of the genre is Flagg Brothers.2 ° "It
would," our current Chief Justice there declared for the court,
intolerably broaden, beyond the scope of any of our previous cases,
the notion of state action under the Fourteenth Amendment to hold
that the mere existence of a body of property law in a State, whether
decisional or statutory, itself amounted to "state action" even though
no state process or state officials were ever involved in enforcing that
16. See Abney, 396 U.S. at 439-44 (1970). In this respect, the case may have been more
debatable than the majority opinion let on. Relying on Justice White's concurring opinion in
Newton, 382 U.S. at 310, Justice Brennan's Abney dissent made the point that Georgia legislators,
a few years prior to the making of the will in question, had enacted laws designed to clear away
doubts that Georgia's common law of property permitted creation of perpetual, charitable trusts on
racially exclusive terms. Brennan argued with some force that the state lawmakers thus had
"single[d] out racial discrimination for particular encouragement," in contravention of the
apparent equal-protection holding in Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). See Abney, 396
U.S. at 457-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
17. See id.. at 444-45.
18. See, e.g., id. at 450, 454 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The Court... affirms the judgment of
the Georgia Supreme Court on the ground that the closing of Baconsfield did not involve state
action ... [because] ... the Court finds that in this case it is not the State or city but 'a private
party which is injecting the racially discriminatory motivation' ....").
19. See id. at 444 ("We agree with petitioners that ... no state law or act can prevail in the
face of contrary federal law . . .; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Here,
however, the action of the Georgia Supreme Court declaring the Baconsfield trust terminated
presents no violation of constitutionally protected rights, and any harshness that may have resulted
from the state court's decision can be attributed solely to its intention to effectuate as nearly as
possible the explicit terms of Senator Bacon's will.").
20. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (concluding that no deprivation by the
state without due process of law has occurred when a warehouseman exercises unilaterally a
summary power of sale of stored goods to collect storage fees allegedly due, under authorization
by the state's enacted version of the Uniform Commercial Code).
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body of law. 2

Such denials, moreover, are commonplace. The Sullivan case is one of
only a few in which the Supreme Court has used the Bill of Rights to
nullify, override, or correct a piece of the common or "private" (or general background) law.2 2 Our jurisprudence has displayed a marked
reluctance to treat such law as the equivalent of "regulatory," statute law
for purposes of Bill of Rights review.
B.

A Contrasting Example: South Africa

The situation differs in some other countries, including South
Africa. That country's "final" post-transition Constitution went into
force in 1996.23 With it has come submission of common law doctrine
21. Id. at 160 n.10.
22. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988), discussed infra note 124 and text
accompanying; NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (overturning on first
amendment grounds a judgment against economic boycotters based on a state's common law of
tort); AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941) (holding that the federal constitutional guarantee of
freedom of expression trumps state common law making it tortious for third parties to conduct
peaceful picketing against an employer involved in a labor dispute). Compare Retail, Wholesale
& Dept. Store Union v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd. [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 (Supreme Court of Canada)
(refusing to subject common law rules - in this case, a rule allowing for injunctions against
secondary picketing - to direct Charter review, but adding that courts "ought" to develop
common law principles to keep them consistent with "the fundamental values enshrined in the
Charter"). See also R.W.D.S.U. v. Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages (West) Ltd., 2002 SCC 8 (Jan.
24, 2002), where the Supreme Court of Canada revised the common law rule applied in Dolphin
Delivery to make it accord more comfortably with Charter values, but left in place the barrier
against direct constitutional review of the common law.
In effect, Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), allowed provisions in the federal Bill of
Rights to override the state's common law of property and tort in a contest between two nominally
private parties. Marsh has since been confined to the never-again-to-be-seen case of a company
town. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 563-64, 569 (1972); Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at
158-59. The so-called "white primary" cases could be described as allowing provisions in the
federal Bill of Rights to override state common law of contract and private association. See, e.g.,
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953). The reach of those cases is limited to settings in which
states effectively delegate the conduct of elections of public officials to nominally private clubs.
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), does not qualify as an instance of the Court's
subjecting state common law to Bill of Rights review. It would have, if the Court had addressed
itself to the question of the compatibility of Missouri's common-law doctrine of equitable
servitude, as applied in Shelley, with Fourteenth Amendment norms and concluded, as
conceivably it might have, that the state law doctrine as applied there failed an equal-protection
test because it gave racial covenants a free pass from certain legal restrictions typically applied to
running covenants and servitudes, see, e.g., Carol Rose, Property Stories: Shelley v. Kraemer, in
PROPERTY STORIES (G. Korngold & A. Morriss eds., 2004) 169, 177-86, 191-93. In fact, however,
the Supreme Court's opinion had nothing to say about the compatibility of Missouri's law with the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court rather focused on the constitutional permissibility of coercive
judicial enforcement of a racially discriminatory private arrangement that had been fashioned in
the shelter of what might have been - indeed, was, for all the opinion had to say about it - a
body of utterly race-neutral state contract law doctrine.
23. REPUBLIC OF SouTH AFRICA CoNsTrruro N OF 1996 [hereinafter SA CoNsT.]. The socalled "Interim" Constitution ("IC") of 1993 [hereinafter SA CONST., 1993] entered fully into
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to Bill of Rights inspection, although not exactly as if such doctrine
were a statute. The Constitution speaks directly to such a practice z4 and

the Constitutional Court affirms it.2 5 There has been controversy about
whether Bill of Rights guarantees are ever to be "directly" applicable in
a common law case involving only private parties, or, alternatively,
application of the Bill of Rights in such cases always should be "indirect."'z6 The matter is now formally settled in favor of direct application
sometimes and indirect application (as I understand the term) potentially
always. 27 There remains some controversy over whether the "direct"/
force at the time of the first democratic parliamentary and presidential election on April 27, 1994.
The terms of the IC had been worked out in a protracted negotiation among contending political
leaders, their seconds and advisers (including technical committees). The resulting agreement
then was enacted into law by the-old regime Parliament, in the form of an ordinary statute. See
Act 200 of 1993, § 251(1). The "final" Constitution ("FC") of 1996 was hammered out and
adopted by a constitutional assembly consisting, in effect, of the newly democratic Parliament
elected under auspices of the IC. See Act 108 of 1996. (The FC underwent review by the
Constitutional Court for compliance with a set of broad "constitutional principles" contained in
the IC.) For a concise review of this history, see Certification of the Constitution of the Republic
of South Africa, 1996, 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) IN 5-21. For closer studies of the underlying
negotiations that make clear their robustly political component, see HASSAN EBRAHIM, THE SOUL
OF A NATION: CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN SOUTH AFRICA (1998); ALLISTER SPARKS, TOMORROW IS
ANOTHER COUNTRY: THE INSIDE STORY OF SouTH AFRICA's ROAD TO CHANGE (1995); RICHARD
SPITz & MATTHEW CHASKALSON, Tan PoLrTcs OF TRANSITION: A HIDDEN HISTORY OF SOUTH
AFRICA'S NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT (2000).

24. See SA CONST. § 8(2) ("A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic
person if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the
nature of any duty imposed by the right."); id. § 8(3)(a) ("When applying a provision of the Bill of
Rights to a natural or juristic person in terms of subsection (2), a court... in order to give effect
to a right in the Bill, must apply, or if necessary develop, the common law to the extent that
legislation does not give effect to that right..."); id. § 39(2) ("When interpreting any legislation,
and when developing the common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must
promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights."). See also id. § 8(1) ("The Bill of
Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of
state."); id. § 7(2) ("The state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of
Rights.").
25. See, e.g., Khumalo v. Holomisa, 2002 (8) BCLR 771 (CC) U 29-34, 2002 SACLR
LEXIS 16; Carmichele v. Minister of Safety, 2001 (10) BCLR 995 (CC) T [33] 2001 SACLR
LEXIS 64 ("[W]here the common law deviates from the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of
Rights the courts have an obligation to develop it by removing that deviation.").
26. For a review of the controversy, see Halton Cheadle, Chapter 3: Application, in M.H.
CHEADLE ET AL., SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE BILL OF RIGHTS (2002).

27. Chris Sprigman & Michael Osborne, Du Plessis is Not Dead: South Africa's 1996
Constitution and the Application of the Bill of Rights to Private Disputes, 15 S.AFR. J. HUM RTS.
15, 30-36 (1999), argue that, contrary to first appearances, sections 8(1) and 8(2) of the 1996
Constitution convey no mandate for direct horizontal application. However that may be, the
Constitutional Court ostensibly has affirmed direct horizontal application in at least one case. In
Khumalo, supra, the CC gave what it called "direct horizontal application" to the Constitution's
free-expression guarantee "as contemplated by section 8(2) of the Constitution." Id.
33.
However, it is not clear how the Court's action in that case differs from what Sprigman and
Osborne (and others) have called indirect application. See infra notes 100-02 and text
accompanying (discussing the Khumalo decision).
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"indirect" distinction matters at all in practice, but that need not concern
us here.28
For our purposes, you really need to know no more than the text of
section 39(2) of the Constitution - "When ... developing the common
law or customary law, every court, tribunal orforum must promote the
spirit,purport and objects of the Bill of Rights" - along with the fact

that, despite the arguably optional wording ("when developing"), the
Constitutional Court has held that judges in common law cases stand at
29
all times under active obligation - at least when prompted by a party
- to consider whether claims and defenses pleaded before them would,

indeed, be authorized by common-law doctrine if duly "developed" in
the manner called for by section 39(2). The clearest such holding occurs
in the widely noted case of Carmichele v. Minister of Safety and Security,30 which also provides a vivid example of the difference constitutional inspection of the common law apparently can make for people's
lives.
Carmichele's case will remind Americans of our DeShaney case. 3 '
Briefly: The plaintiff had been seriously injured in a sexual assault by a

man free on bail pending trial on charges of a prior, violent sexual
assault. She lodged a tort suit against the Minister, claiming that various
police and prosecutorial officials under his charge both owed her a legal
duty of protection and culpably had failed to perform it - their failure
28. The issue conceivably could affect the set of cases in which, under the common law as the
judiciary finds it to exist prior to any constitutionally mandated reinspection, a would-be
plaintiffs claim of unlawful treatment by another would be subject to a motion to dismiss (as
Americans would say) for failure state a claim on which relief can be granted. Suppose it is this
very denial of a cause of action to a person complaining of a certain kind of treatment - say,
another party's allegedly arbitrary refusal to hire her for an open position - that the aggrieved
party wishes to contend is deviant from the spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill of Rights. It
may be thought that, in order for any judicial officer to come under the constitutionally imposed
obligation to develop this branch of the common law so as to remove the alleged deviance (which
is what I take to be meant by indirect application of the Bill of Rights), some court first must
become seized of the matter, and that this step is exactly what is prevented by the dismissibility of
the would-be plaintiffs claim under the extant, pre-"constitutionalized" common law. If so, then
it may seem that the only way to bring this dismissibility under constitutional review would be to
treat the alleged wrongful injurer in the case -- the boss who refused to hire the would-be
plaintiff as "directly" suable for a Bill of Rights violation. See, e.g., Van der Walt,
Perspectives, supra note 11, at 11-12, 17 (relating that the author at one time advocated the
necessity of direct Bill of Rights application to common-law disputes, but only because he then
believed that there were such things as "extra-legal social relations" and only in this way could
such relations be "brought within the ambit of the Constitution, should justice so require.") For
perspicuous revision of that view, under Hohfeldian influence, see id. at 6, 15, 20-21; Van der
Walt, Co-operativeRelation, supra note 12, at 352-55; Johan Van der Walt, Threshold,supra note
12, at 534-37.
29. See note 39, infra.
30. Carmichele, 2001 (10) BCLR 995 (CC), 2001 SACLR LEXIS 64.
31. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).

20031

THE FREEDOM-FRIENDLY STATE

consisting, in part, of refusal to oppose bail for the perpetrator when they
had ample reason to know that he posed an immediate danger to women

in the neighborhood. After hearing the plaintiffs evidence, the trial
judge dismissed her claim as insufficient in law. The dismissal order
was upheld by Supreme Court of Appeal ("SCA"), the tribunal that
heads up what we roughly may call the common law branch of South
Africa's judiciary.32 According to South African common law, both
courts held, police and other public officials do not in general owe any
positive duty of protection to individual members of the public; such a
duty may spring up when officials form special relationships with particular persons, but no such relationship existed in this case.33 At no point
did either the trial court or the SCA advert to any duty or power either
body might have to "promote the spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill
of Rights" by "developing" the common law in a direction favorable to
the plaintiffs cause.
Precisely because of this oversight, the Constitutional Court ("CC")
reversed the judgment of dismissal.3 4 The Bill of Rights guarantees to
"everyone" the "right" of "freedom and security of the person"3 5 and it
further specifies that "the state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil
the rights in the Bill of Rights. 36 In the CC's view, it was clear in the
light of these texts 37 that section 39(2) demands reinspection of a body
of common-law doctrine calling for dismissal of a case like
Carmichele's; moreover, the duty to provide such reinspection is incumbent upon any High Court 38 or appellate court before which such a case
may come.39 The CC reversed the High Court's order of dismissal and
32. See Part lIA for a more precise account of the SCA's jurisdiction.
33. For a concise account of the reasoning of the lower courts in Carmichele, see Van der
Walt, Threshold, supra note 12.
34. Carmichele, 2001 (10) BCLR 995, U 32, 39.
35. SA CONST. § 12(1).
36. Id. § 7(2).
37. The CC also referred to constitutional guarantees respecting life (§ 11) and human dignity
(§ 10). See Cartnichele, 2001 (10) BCLR 995, T 44; and further, by clear implication, to the
constitutional guarantee respecting equality (§ 9), see id. 57 (referring to the right, "in particular,
... of women to have their safety and security protected").
38. Le., a trial court possessed of full, general jurisdiction. See SA CONST. §§ 169, 173.
39. See Carmichele, 2001 (10) BCLR 995 39 ("It needs to be stressed that the obligation of
courts to develop the common law, in the context of the section 39(2) objectives, is not purely
discretionary. On the contrary, it is implicit in section 39(2) ... that where the common law as it
stands is deficient in promoting the section 39(2) objectives, the courts are under a general
obligation to develop it appropriately. We say a 'general obligation' because we do not mean to
suggest that a court must, in each and every case where the common law is involved, embark on
an independent exercise as to whether the common law is in need of development and, if so, how
it is to be developed under section 39(2). At the same time there might be circumstances where a
court is obliged to raise the matter on its own and require full argument from the parties.").
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remanded the case for further proceedings.4 ° On remand, the trial court
did develop the common law in a manner leading to a judgment for the
plaintiff,4 ' and the SCA affirmed the judgment.4 2
One hardly can imagine a more dramatic instance of so-called indirect application of the Bill of Rights to a common law case and the
difference it can make to parties and to society. Do you wonder what it
is about this application that brings it under the heading "indirect?"
Nothing, it may seem, but the fact that no party to the litigation has been
found to have acted in a way defined by the Constitution as wrongful or
substandard; it being only certain judges whose conduct the CC has criticized in terms of that kind.43 Regarding the Carmichele defendants, the
worst we possibly can say is that, in the result, they were held liable for
a common law tort. In practical terms, of course, it is the defendants
who suffer the consequences - and the plaintiff who reaps the benefit
- of the penance imposed by the CC on the constitutionally errant
judges. From the litigants' point of view, and society's at large for
whom the law serves as a guide to future conduct, it hardly seems to
matter that application of the Bill of Rights to the case-at-bar has been
"indirect," not "direct." And yet the difference does seem to matter to
some members of another class of significant stakeholders in South African law, as we shall see. 44
40. See id. H 83-84.
41. See Carmichele v. Minister of Safety & Sec., 2002 (10) BCLR 1100 (C). It will be of
interest later that CC did not see fit to undertake by itself the requisite reinspection of the common
law. See Part IVB.
42. See Minister of Safety & Sec. v. Carmichele, Case No. 533/02, decided Nov. 14, 2003
(Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa), available at http://wwwserver.law.wits.ac.za/sca/
files/53302/53302.pdf (last visited March 3, 2004). Whether the SCA's opinion is best read as
resting the affirmance on a "developed" common law claim, or rather as resting it on a claim
directly rooted in public (and possibly constitutional) law, is a question I must leave to trained
South African lawyers.
43. Cf. Van der Walt, Co-operative Relation, supra note 12, at 348 (pointing out that, in the
German version of indirect constitutional review in private-law cases, reviewing courts never
suggest that "a [constitutional] right was violated by a private legal subject;" rather, the
"violation" is always described as an error of legal interpretation committed by a trial judge.)
Compare Halton Cheadle & Dennis Davis, Chapter 1: Structure of the Bill of Rights, in CHEADLE
ET AL., supra note 26, § 1.2 ("The first premise is that a constitution is primarily concerned with
the making, the content and the application of rules. In this respect, the Bill of Rights in the final
Constitution is no different. Its primary emphasis is in respect of rules and not conduct. Conduct
may give rise to the testing or development of a rule under the Bill of Rights but should never,
itself, be the subject of constitutional enquiry.").
44. See Part IVA. Stephen Ellmann points to two potentially significant, systemic differences
between direct application of a constitutional mandate to a private dispute and development of
applicable common law to keep it acceptably attuned to the Constitution's principles and values.
First, a direct application might, at least sometimes, necessarily convey a specific, judicially
endorsed rule of constitutional law that Parliament would be powerless to alter save by formal
constitutional amendment, whereas a judicial choice regarding common law development would
often leave Parliament with room to impose a different choice that the courts also would find
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C.

Plan of the Article

So far, we have noticed the reluctance of U.S. courts to subject
common law doctrine to constitutional-normative assessment, and contrasted it with the readiness and, indeed, the constitutionally imposed
obligation of the South African judiciary to do exactly that. In what
follows, we shall look more closely at both terms in the comparison,
especially the South African. As we do so, we shall draw some connections between what our more refined, comparative review discloses and
the scholarly work of Owen Fiss. Here, roughly, is the plan: First, we
notice how a major theme in Professor Fiss's work suggests that he
should be warmly receptive to the South African development I have
just been describing. Next, we notice a reason, not particularly drawn
from Fiss's work but from more general considerations, why he might
nevertheless feel some caution regarding it.
Finally, I shall point out that this more general consideration falls
short of being able to explain a certain feature in the South Africa picture, which is this: Within the formal set-up represented by South
Africa, in which Bill of Rights inspection of common-law doctrine is
constitutionally mandated and judicially embraced, common law is
treated, it seems - sometimes, by some practitioners - with a distinct
sort of respect, as common law.4 5 Such a posture of distinct respect for
the common law may look surprising at least to this extent: It is only
statute law, after all, not common law, that can claim whatever measure
of deference may be owing to the judgments and choices of a democratically accountable Parliament.4 6 I shall end this article by suggesting that
underpinnings for an attitude of distinct regard for the common law can
be found in Owen Fiss's scholarship.

acceptable. See Stephen Ellmann, A Constitutional Confluence: American "State Action" Law
and the Application of South Africa's Socioeconomic Rights to PrivateActors, 45 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 21, 45 (2000-2001); Sprigman & Osborne, supra note 27, at 15, 28-29, 36, 42. Second, a
finding of direct violation of the Constitution might have a sharper stigmatizing and deterrent on
the class of conduct in question than would a finding of common law violation. See Ellmann,
supra, at 47.
45. See Part IVB.
46. See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 260-61 (1941) ("a 'declaration of the State's
policy would weigh heavily in any challenge of the law as infringing constitutional limitations.'
But ... the problem is different where 'the judgment is based on a common law concept of the
most general and undefined nature.' . . . For here the legislature of California has not appraised a
particular kind of situation and found a specific danger sufficiently imminent to justify a
restriction on a particular kind of utterance. The judgments below, therefore, do not come to us
encased in the armor wrought by prior legislative deliberation." (citations omitted)).
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FROM CONSTITUTIONAL PURPOSE TO THE
FREEDOM-FRIENDLY STATE

We began this article by noticing what seems an impeccable, conceptual argument for laying the common law wide open to Bill of Rights
inspection, once judicial constitutional review of statutes is in place. We
next turn to a different sort of argument for doing so, one that is functional and ideological. This argument is easily gleaned from the work of
Owen Fiss. He should approve it.
In the Fiss canon on constitutionalism and constitutional law, a
constant and dominant theme is the thesis, as I shall call it, of the freedom-friendly state. (I have in mind Fiss's remark that whereas liberals
used to view the state as "a natural enemy of freedom," these days we
are learning to "imagine the state as a friend of freedom."4 7 ) As I am
about to reconstruct it, the freedom-friendly state thesis emerges in a
series of four claims.
The first and most basic claim is that the point of a constitutional
bill of rights is to direct and constrain political practice toward the fulfillment, for everyone, of certain super-valued interests attributed to
every person just as such. More extensively stated, the purpose is to
commit all future lawmakers, and other future operators of the country's
legal system, to the achievement of a social state of affairs in which not
only to do direct infringements of the super-valued interests not occur
with any frequency, but everyone is enabled to realize and enjoy the
"worth" or "fair value" of these interests.4 8 In the purest form of this
view, a constitutional bill of rights simply is a tool or device in a human
rights project. Not only does it aim at actual access by persons to the
enjoyment of super-valued interests, it does so strictly for the sake of
those persons, out of concern and regard for them. In Ronald Dworkin's
terms, the project is "right-based," not "goal-based." 4 9
Fiss does not advocate such a cleanly right-based view. There can
be goal-based, social-systemic reasons for being attentive to inequalities
in the actual conditions of persons with respect to enjoyment of their
rights or super-valued interests. As any casual reader of Fiss's First
Amendment essays 50 will know, our man sees the Constitution as concerned with the distribution of the actual exercise and enjoyment of free47.
48.
Values,
49.
50.

Owen M. Fiss, The Many Faces of the State, 6 REV. CONST. STUD. 1, 7 (2001).
See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 204 (1973); Frank I. Michelman, Liberties, Fair
and ConstitutionalMethod, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 91, 97 (1992).
See RONALD DWORK1N, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 171-73 (1986).
The main collections are OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH (1996) and OwEN

M. FIss, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MANY USES OF STATE POWER

(1996). Specific formulations I cite below have often been taken, as indicated, from more recent
essays relying on the earlier ones.
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speech rights, primarily for the sake of good government - robust and
open public debate - and only, perhaps, "incidentally" 5 ' for the sake of
individual well-being. 2 The point on which I insist is that Fiss nevertheless has seen as normatively crucial the question of the right of every
person to full enjoyment of the interests guaranteed by our Bill of
Rights. 3 His defenses of both hate-speech regulation and controls on
electoral spending proceed on the assumption that securing every individual's entitlement - as a right - to the actual enjoyment and exercise of freedom of speech is the underlying point and purpose of the
First Amendment. 4
The foregoing is by no means a self-evident or uncontested proposition.55 An individual-rights project is one thing, a limited-government project is another, and constitutional bills of rights easily may be
understood, and often have been, as strictly a tool or device of the latter.
The point and purpose of a bill of rights, then - as of constitutionalism
in general - would be to keep a potentially oppressive and tyrannical
government under restraint.5 6 The harms and pains to be avoided would
be those that persons will suffer if the bill-of-rights fetters on government fail, along with other institutional checks and balances. If that is
your view of what the Bill of Rights is mainly about - if shackling the
state is what you take to be the driving purpose - then Fiss's arguments
57
will not work for you.
The second claim in the chain leading to the freedom-friendly state
thesis follows directly on acceptance of the first. It is that the highly
51. See Owen M. Fiss, A Freedom Both Personal and Political, in JOHN STUART MILL, ON
LIBERTY 179, 183 (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., 2002).
52. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, The Idea of Political Freedom, in LOOKING BACK AT LAW'S
CENTURY 36 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 1999); Owen Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, in
LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 50, at 7, 29-30. See also Fiss, Personaland Political, supra, at
183-84, where Fiss distinguishes J. S. Mill's "primarily personal, as opposed to political" defense
of freedom of speech from the rationale he ascribes to the Constitution. "Whereas," Fiss writes,
"for Mill freedom of speech was essential for the full development of the individual personality,"
the framers valued this freedom "for the contribution it makes to the workings of the democratic
system." For a right-based theorist's denial that this represents the best way of looking at the First
Amendment, see RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW ch. 8 (1996).
53. See Fiss, PoliticalFreedom, supra, at 36 (speaking of "a right that the individual enjoys
as a member of the community and that is essential to the effective functioning of that
community"); id. at 37 (asserting that the freedom conferred by the First Amendment "belongs to
individuals as participants in the political system . . . because it serves the needs and interests of
that system"); id. at 42 (same).
54. See, e.g., Fiss, Many Faces, supra note 47, at 5-6.
55. It is, however, a proposition with which I am in declared agreement. See Michelman,
Fair Value, supra note 48, at 94.
56. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737 (1989).
57. Fiss expressly distinguishes his view of the aim of a Bill of Rights from one based on an
"antitotalitarian principle." Fiss, Political Freedom, supra note 52, at 38.
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valued interests of persons that bills of rights (according to the first
claim) are meant to secure against infringement stand roughly in as
much danger of infringement by other natural persons and private organizations, exercising rights, powers, privileges, and immunities conferred on them by general law, as they stand in danger of infringement
by lawmakers and officials exercising the special powers of the state.58
Owners of regional shopping centers repress speech as much by invoking the common law of trespass against those who wish to leaflet on the
premises as city officials would by closing the public sidewalks to
leafletters. 59 The phenomenon is not limited to the hackneyed shoppingcenter example, but rather extends as far abroad in social life as the
content of a given bill of rights will let it. Suppose everyone has a constitutionally super-valued interest in earning a living or in free choice of
trade, occupation, or profession. 60 Employers exercising firing powers
under at-will employment contracts may threaten those interests as
gravely as state lawmakers do when they regulate trades and professions. Suppose everyone has a constitutionally super-valued interest in
having "access to sufficient food and water. ' 61 Food-sellers exercising
powers under the law of contract to set highly profitable prices for their
wares, and landowners exercising rights and privileges under the law of
property to convert land from food production to game parks, may
threaten those interests as gravely as any state official ever would be
likely to do.
Consequently, the third claim in the chain leading to the freedomfriendly-state thesis is this. It makes no sense to refuse application of
bill of rights guarantees to cases in which infringements of constitutionally super-valued interests of persons are wrought by private agents
exercising rights, powers, privileges, and immunities conferred on them
by general or common law, 61 as distinguished from cases in which the
infringements come directly from officials wielding the force of the
63
state, or exercising special rights, powers, privileges, or immunities
reserved to the state and its officials.'
58. See, e.g., id. at 50 ("[P]rivate actors can threaten public debate just as much as state
actors" and "the state may sometimes be the only power in society keeping these forces at bay.").
59. See, e.g, New Jersey Coalition Against the War v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757
(N.J. 1994) (reasoning thus in concluding that the free-expression guarantee of the New Jersey
Constitution overrides the common law of trespass in such a case).
60. See SA CONST. § 22.
61. Id.§ 27(1)(b).
62. See supra notes 11-12 and text accompanying.
63. Hereinafter simply "powers."
64. See, e.g., Fiss, Political Freedom, supra note 52 at 51 (noting how a recognition of the
state's affirmative duty to secure everyone's political freedom would obliterate the "state action"
issue from the shopping-center cases). For direct counter-argument, see Charles Fried, Perfect
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The fourth claim - we can call this the freedom-friendly state thesis proper - takes an additional step. It says that the Bill of Rights
imposes active obligations on the state to make sure that its deployments
of its special powers are duly attuned to the aim of protecting persons
effectively against privately wrought infringements of their constitutionally super-valued interests. Since the state's special powers obviously
include powers to decide from time to time what the law is, it follows
that courts assessing the constitutionality of government lawmaking
ought to take this active obligation into account. Had our Supreme
Court done so in Buckley v. Valeo,65 for example, it might not have been
so quick to condemn as unconstitutional a congressional enactment that
ostensibly and plausibly was designed to protect the effective political
speech of everyone by restricting the political expenditures of the
wealthy. The Court's avowed premise was that "the concept that the
government may restrict the speech of some in order to enhance the
relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment ... "'
That premise is miscast, in Fiss's view. The Court went wrong, he
maintains, by treating the case as one where Congress sought to restrict
liberty for the sake of equality. If, instead, the case had clearly been
framed by the Court as one of liberty versus liberty - Congress acting
to protect the public interest in "collective self-governance" that is
served by securing the fair values of some people's constitutionally
super-valued liberties against infringement by other people's exercise of
their own parallel liberties - that framing would have made it much
harder for the Court to override a congressional judgment about where
to strike the balance.67
In sum: The state may be one source of threat to our constitutionally protected interests, including our interests in freedom, but it is not
the only one and it also is the savior of last resort for those interests
against the threats posed to them by powerful agents in civil society.6 8
That is the freedom-friendly state thesis in a nutshell.
Freedom, Perfect Justice, 78 B.U. L. REV. 717, 736-41 (1998); Charles Fried, The New First
Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 225, 234-37 (1992).
65. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
66. Id. at 48-49.
67. See, e.g., Fiss, Many Faces, supra note 47, at 5-6 (urging the view that "equality is not
just a separate value but also a part of free speech itself').
68. Recognition of the state's dual role as threatener and savior of last resort has cropped up
elsewhere in American constitutional theory, in sundry guises. Consider, for example, Joseph
Sax's widely noted distinction between the "enterprise" and "arbitral" capacities in which a state
may act when it regulates the use of privately held land - Sax urging that action in the former
role, but not the latter, exposes the state to a possible liability for an uncompensated taking of
property prohibited by the Fifth Amendment. See Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power,
74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964). For discussion of puzzles arising out of recognition that the state may act
as threatener of protected interests through the very acts it takes as protector of them against
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CONSTITUTIONAL INSPECTION OF THE COMMON LAW:

A

BOON FOR FREEDOM?

In some countries across the world - South Africa is our example,
but there are others -

the official position is that common law doctrine

is substantially open to inspection for compatibility with a constitutional

bill of rights.69 I would bet that most American legal thinkers of the

egalitarian-liberal persuasion, people like Owen Fiss and me - call us
"Brennan liberals" 7 - cannot help cheering such a choice and yearning
for the same to happen here. Think of how we feel about DeShaney, for
example - recall Justice Brennan's dissent in that case 71 - and contrast South Africa's Carmichele decision. Brennan liberals instinctively

will nod in agreement with the South African academic commentator
who remarked that introduction of "constitutional review of ... private
law relations," had it occurred in the United States, "could have brought
about a radical democratisation of the law."7 2

American Brennanites are conditioned by experience to react in this
way. If the South African development were copied here, that apparently would do away with all trace of a "state action" barrier to legal
relief in the name of the Bill of Rights,73 and we've been taught - or
we have taught ourselves - to see that barrier as tendentiously inimical

to the causes we favor. In every case that jumps to mind in which the
Supreme Court has found state action after visibly straining to do so, its
doing so has allowed our "side" to prevail. 4 In every case that jumps to
infringement by private actors, see Jeremy Paul, The Hidden Structure of Takings Law, 64 So.
CAL. L. REv. 6 (1991).
69. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, The Issue of State Action/Horizontal Effect in Comparative
ConstitutionalLaw, 1 INT. J. COMP. L. 79 (2003), and authorities cited; JOHAN VAN DER WALT,
TANGIBLE MAIS INTOUCHABLE, LA LOI DU TACT, LA LOI DE LA LOI: THE FUTURE AND FUTURITY OF
THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIsTINCTION IN THE VIEW OF THE HORIZONTAL APPLICATION OF

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 106-08 & n.23 (2002); Ellmann, supra note 44, at 37-40 n. 52 (2000-2001)
(presenting an extensive and detailed survey of the pertinent constitutional law of numerous
jurisdictions, including the jurisdiction constituted by the European Convention on Human
Rights).
70. See FRANK I. MICHELMAN, BRENNAN AND DEMOCRACY 119-21 (1999).
71. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 203 (1989).
72. VAN DER WALT, FUTURE AND FUTuerry, supra note -, at 108 n. 133. Professor Van der
Walt continues: "[T]he horizontal application of fundamental rights can be said to represent a
revolutionary voice in contemporary societies." Id. at 109. His full view is more complex and
guarded, however. See infra text accompanying notes 62-68, 182.
73. See Part IA.
74. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil
Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S.
296 (1966); Peterson v. Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth.,
365 U.S. 715 (1961); Pennsylvania v. Bd. of Dir. of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957); Terry v.
Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S.
501 (1946).
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mind in which the Court has declined to find state action when it easily
could have done so, it has thereby deprived our side of victory.75 This
simple fact may help explain why bashing the public-private distinction
has been a long-standing project of the American legal-academic left.7 6
In Parts IA and II, I presented conceptual and ideological arguments to the effect that common law ought to be no less subject than
statute law to judicial inspection for consonance with the requirements
of a constitutional bill of rights. In this Part, I ask how eager, really,
Brennan liberals should be to see such arguments put into practice. We
shall have to work through a few preliminaries before reaching the main
question.
A.

The Notion of a Common-Law Judiciary

As we shall see,77 the main question devolves largely to one about
whether reasons for distrusting the lawmaking products of legislatures
apply in the same way and degree to the lawmaking products of a common law judiciary. Now, for the question in that form really to bite, it
must be the case that there is a common law judiciary, existing separate
and apart from the constitutional judiciary that sits in judgment of the
constitutional merits of legislation and possibly - this is our question
- of the common law. (If the constitutional and common law judiciaries were one and the same, why would we worry about the question?)
As it happens, the condition of institutional separation of the common-law from the constitutional judiciary is substantially satisfied in
both the United States and the country we have chosen for comparison,
South Africa. In South Africa, the separation is not-quite-expressly dictated by the Constitution, and the gap is filled by an apparent practice of
the Constitutional Court.7 8 By constitutional provision, South Africa
has two pinnacle courts, the Supreme Court of Appeal ("SCA") and the
Constitutional Court ("CC"). The former serves as the country's court of
last resort in all matters not involving interpretation or application of the
Constitution.7 9 The SCA thus sits at the apex of the common-law judici75. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830
(1982); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S.
345 (1974); Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970). Cf
Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001) (refusing to allow a Bivens action against a
private entity performing a government-like function - detention as punishment for crime under government authorization); Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (construing
Civil Rights Act).
76. See, e.g., A Symposium: The Public/PrivateDistinction, 130 U. PA. L. Rnv. 1289 (1982).
77. See Part IVB.
78. See infra notes 82, 202-03 and text accompanying.
79. See SA CONST. § 168(3) ("The Supreme Court of Appeal . . . is the highest court of
appeal except in constitutional matters.").
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ary. The CC has the last word in matters touching the Constitution," °
but its jurisdiction correspondingly is limited to such matters.8 1 Thus,

the only way the CC possibly could adjudicate in a common-law case
would be by reviewing the work of the SCA and lower courts for com-

patibility with constitutional standards and requirements.

The net

practical result is that there is full institutional separation between common-law and the constitutional judiciaries in South Africa.
The situation in the United States is virtually the same, even though
our Supreme Court's jurisdiction is not limited to constitutional questions.8 3 The key, of course, is our federalism. No ghost of Swift v.
Tyson 84

walks the land. There being no "federal general common
it can only be the common law of some state that, almost without
exception, must supply a substantive rule of decision for non-statutory
law," 85

cases tried in federal courts.8 6 Consequently, our national Supreme
Court today regards itself as powerless to pronounce on garden-variety,

common law questions of tort, contract, property, and restitution, saving
those rare moments when the Court, exceptionally, regards the common
law decision-making of state courts as trenching on federal constitutional-legal supremacy. 87 To all intents and purposes relevant to this
article, the situation parallels South Africa's.
80. See id. § 167(3)(a), (c) ("The Constitutional Court - (a) is the highest court in all
constitutional matters; . . . and (c) makes the final decision whether a matter is a constitutional
matter or whether an issue is connected with a decision on a constitutional matter.").
81. See id. § 167(b) ("The Constitutional Court . . . (b) may decide only constitutional
matters, and issues connected with decisions on constitutional matters."). The CC has developed
an expansive conception of the category of "constitutional matters." See Pharmaceutical Mfrs. of
South Africa: In re Ex parte President of the Republic of South Africa, 2000 (2) BCLR 241 (CC);
Ellmann, supra note 44, at 49 n.85.
82. The waters are muddied a bit by the inclusion of a constitutional provision granting the
CC, along with other courts, an "inherent power" to "develop the common law, taking into
account the interests of justice." SA CONST. § 173 ("The Constitutional Court, Supreme Court of
Appeal and High Courts [i.e., the main nisi prius courts] have the inherent power to protect and
regulate their own process, and to develop the common law, taking into account the interests of
justice."). Reading this text in pari materia with section 167(b), one easily might conclude that
the CC's "inherent" power of common-law development is exercisable only in aid of its power of
constitutional review of the work of lower courts, as in Carmichele. The CC so far has skirted the
question, by following a policy that the substantive work of common-law development under
mandate of section 39(2) ought usually to be left in the first instance to the SCA and lower courts.
See Part IVB.
83. See U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2.
84. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled, Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938).
85. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
86. See id.
87. See supra note 22 and text accompanying. We may assume - although the matter is
contested - that a common lawmaking power continues to be recognized in the federal judiciary
for a few special classes of cases and problems. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, ConstrictingRemedies:
The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal Power, 78 INo. L. REv. 223, 236-38 (2003). It
makes no difference for purposes of this article.

20031

THE FREEDOM-FRIENDLY STATE

B.

The Common Law As Facilitative

As we have seen, the freedom-friendly state thesis of Owen Fiss
implies a demand to bring common-law (or "private law") doctrine
within range of judicial constitutional review for compatibility with the
guarantees of the Bill of Rights. The thesis demands that the state
deploy its special powers, including lawmaking powers, with a view to
minimizing privately engineered infringements of constitutionally supervalued interests of persons; and such private infringements, when they
occur, often will be wrought by persons exercising rights, powers, privileges, and immunities conferred on them by the common law. 88 Assessing claims of constitutionally intolerable, privately engineered
infringement, then, inevitably will involve courts in assessment of common-law doctrines against standards drawn from the country's constitutional bill of rights.
Does it matter that a great deal of common-law doctrine is perceived as "facilitative," not "regulatory?" We see this law as providing
background rules and transactional frameworks, by and within which
free private agents in a broadly speaking market society are enabled to
order their own affairs and relations as they see fit. Standard examples
are the law of trespass, the law of battery, the law of fraud, the law of
adverse possession, the law governing contract formation, the law governing testation, and the law governing private associations. In Evans v.
Abney, 89 for example, the Court twice emphasized that the relevant
Georgia laws of trust and testation were "long standing and neutral with
regard to race." 9° A great deal of the private law corpus juris undoubtedly the major fraction of it - shares this look of being policyneutral and transparent to diverse private purposes. Does it follow, from
these apparent attributes of neutrality and transparency in the bulk of the
common law, that the bulk of the common law can be exempted categorically from inspection for compatibility with what the South Africans
call "the spirit, purport, and objects" of the Bill of Rights? 9 ' It does not,
certainly not in the eyes of anyone committed to the freedom-friendly
state thesis.
In the view of the freedom-friendly state thesis, the neutrality and
88. Or by that law as modified and codified by background-law statutes such as the Uniform
Commercial Code, the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act, and the like. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v.
Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (refusing to find state action in a warehouseman's exercise of its
summary power of sale of stored goods, to satisfy a warehouseman's lien, as provided by the
state's enacted version of the U.C.C.).
89. 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
90. See id. at 444, 446.
91. See SA CONST. § 39(2) (directing courts engaged in "developing" the common law to do
so in a manner designed to "promote" the spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill of Rights).
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transparency of a given piece of common law doctrine may be the very
feature that makes the doctrine constitutionally questionable. For Americans, the classic example comes from the fountainhead of the state
action doctrine, the Civil Rights Cases.9 2 Do innkeepers and common
carriers enjoy a common-law right and privilege to extend and refuse
service on a race-discriminatory basis, or are they rather under duties to
serve all comers on like terms? It appears that the common law on the
point goes one way in some states and the other way in others, and that
in some states it has switched historically from one way to the other. 93
The common law, in other words, has a choice to make in this field, as it
always, inevitably, has in all fields (Hohfeld's lesson 94). Now, a choice
to grant establishment owners the right and privilege of serving whom
they will on terms they choose will have exactly those attributes of neutrality and transparency I have mentioned. And yet, as legislatures all
over this land have perceived, that neutral and transparent setting of the
common law rule, in our country in our historical situation, quite reasonably can be judged antithetical to the spirit, purport, and objects of the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. 95 Conformity might require
alteration of a common law rule to put specific public policy quite
explicitly into it. The freedom-friendly state thesis is hard to repress.
The point is general, not limited to situations as egregious as Jim
Crow. In fact, its potential range of application has no natural limit at
all. Let me cite a few examples from South Africa. All of the cases I
am about to mention have made their ways to that country's highest
appellate levels and have been treated very seriously. (1) Plaintiffs
harmed by use of a drug sued the manufacturer on a theory of strict
liability, although South African common law to date had rejected strict
liability for drug manufacturers. The plaintiff maintained that the rule
refusing strict liability is fatally at odds with the Constitution's guarantee to everyone of the right to "bodily and psychological integrity." 96
The SCA rejected this claim after careful consideration, taking note that
the common-law doctrine of res ipsa loquitur often relieves plaintiffs of
92. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
93. See generally Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and
Private Property, 90 Nw. U.L. REV. 1283 (1996).
94. See Duncan Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8
HOFSTRA L. Rev. 711, 755 (1980); Van der Walt, Perspectives, supra note 11, at 14-15.
95. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title II, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000 et seq.; Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 249 (1964) ("The legislative history of the Act
indicates that Congress based the Act on § 5 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment as well as its power to regulate interstate commerce under Art. I, § 8, cl.3, of the
Constitution."). See also id. at 257 ("In framing Title II of this Act Congress was... dealing with
what it considered a moral problem," and not just with burdens on interstate commerce.).
96. SA CONST. § 12(1).
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having to marshal positive evidence of negligence, even where, in principle, liability is fault-based. 97 (2) A private hospital included in its
boilerplate agreement with admitted patients a clause exempting the hospital from liability for harms resulting from the negligence of staff members. A patient sought to have this exculpatory clause set aside, on the
ground that giving effect to such a clause - as established common-law
doctrine would do - would be out of keeping with the "spirit, purport,
and objects" of the Bill of Rights insofar as it confers on everyone a
right of access to health care services." The trial court agreed and set
aside the exculpatory clause, but the Supreme Court of Appeal
reversed.9 9 (3) A newspaper charged a private adversary, in effect, with
infringing the paper's constitutional fight of freedom of expression by
asserting, in court, a common-law right to recover damages for defamation without having to prove the falsity of the offending publication. o
This charge was rejected by the Constitutional Court, but only after the
Court had satisfied itself that the common law of defamation - as
recently adjusted by the country's common-law judiciary in light of the
new Constitution 1° ' - gave due weight not only to the Constitution's
conferral on everyone of the right to protection of their dignity but also
its conferral on everyone of the right to freedom of expression.'0 2 (4)
The male life-partner of a man tortiously killed claimed a right to
recover damages for loss of support. Pre-existing common law allowed
for such recovery by spouses only. The SCA concluded that the common law must be developed to encompass recovery by a surviving partner in a same-sex union, because (among other reasons) such a
development would be "in accordance with the behests of the Constitution."'0 3 (5) A lesbian couple challenged the common law rule restricting marriage to opposite-sex unions as disconsonant with constitutional
97. See Wagener v. Pharmacare Ltd., Case No. 32-2002 (March 28, 2003) (SCA). The
judgment can be found at http://wwwserver.law.wits.ac.za/sca/judgment.php?casejid=12332 (last
visited July 17, 2003).

98. See SA CONST. § 27(1)(a).
99. See Afrox Health Care v. Strydom, 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA).
100. See Khumalo v. Holomisa, 2002 (3) SA 38 (T). The defendants sought a "direct"
application of the Bill of Rights to the plaintiffs actions, but what act of the plaintiffs could have
amounted to a violation of constitutional norms? It would have to have been the plaintiffs act of
exercising his common-law power to subject the defendants to the costs and hazards of a
defamation suit, under rules - for such the plaintiff claimed they were - that leave defendants
bearing the risk of non-persuasion on the truth issue.

101. See National Media v. Bogoshi, 1999 (1) BCLR 1 (SCA), 1998 SACLR LEXIS 37.
102. See Khumalo v. Holomisa, 2002 (8) BCLR 771 (CC), 2002 SACLR LEXIS 16; SA
§§ 10 (dignity), 15 (freedom of expression). The CC noted that the remodeled defamation
doctrine allows not only an affirmative defense that the publication is true and in the public
interest, but also an affirmative defense that the decision to publish was reasonable. See Khumalo,
supra W 39, 43.
103. Du Plessis v. Road Accident Fund, 2003 (11) BCLR 1220 (SCA)
34, 2003 SACLR
CONST.
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guarantees respecting equality and dignity. Their claim was dismissed
by the High Court.' °4 They appealed directly to the Constitutional
Court, which dismissed the appeal, but only on the ground that the matter should be taken first to the Supreme Court of Appeal.° 5 There are
other instances, and new ones keep cropping up. How large the iceberg
eventually may prove remains to be seen.
C.

Interlude: A Cautionary Tale

During the period leading up to the U.S. Supreme Court's issuance
of its 1857 decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford,11 6 a very precise question
divided the new Republican party - which Abraham Lincoln soon
would head - from the Northern wing of the Democratic party led by
Senator Stephen A. Douglas. The question was: ought Congress to
enact laws to keep the remaining western territories of the United States
slavery-free prior to statehood? Republicans said yes, and this answer,
in fact, was a chief proposition around which the party recently had
organized itself.1 07 Democrats defended, instead, a policy based on a
principle of local political self-determination or "popular sovereignty,"
according to which the populations in each organized territory should
settle for themselves, by political means, the legal status of slavery
within their respective borders, pending statehood. 10 8 According to
widespread perception, the Democratic Party had largely succeeded in
enacting their policy into law by the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854.1°9
Republicans were in the position of campaigning for a legislative reversal by getting themselves elected to the House, the Senate, and, eventually, the White House. 1" 0
On the face of it, the Supreme Court's Dred Scott decision ought to
have brought this controversy to a standstill. The Court had concluded
LEXIS 42; see SA Const. § 9(3) (prohibiting unfair discrimination, direct or indirect, against any
person on any of several grounds, including the ground of sexual orientation).
104. See Fourie v. Minister of Home Affairs, 2003 (10) BCLR 1092 (CC), 2003 SACLR
LEXIS 45,
1-3 (describing lower-court proceedings).
105. See Fourie, supra, IT 12-13.
106. 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
107. See WtL1AM E. GIENAPP, THE ORIGINS OP THE REPUBLICAN PARTY 1852-56, at 335
(describing the platform adopted at the first Republican national nominating convention in 1856);
id. at 267-69 (describing controversy over whether the Republican Party would demand abolition
of slavery from territories where it existed or would merely demand exclusion of slavery from
territories where it had not yet entered).
108. Lincoln, you may be sure, had plenty of good rhetorical sport with the idea that whitemajoritarian choice in favor of slavery was an application of a moral principle in favor of selfgovernment. See, e.g., 2 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 265-66 (Roy P. Basler ed.,
1953) (speech at Peoria, Illinois, Oct. 16, 1854).
109. See 2 ALLAN NEVINS, ORDEAL OF THE UNION 95 (1947).
110. See, e.g., COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 108, at 272-73.
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that neither Congress nor a pre-statehood, territorial legislature could
make a valid law excluding slavery from a territory. The cited basis for
this ruling was the Fifth Amendment's command against depriving any
person of property without due process of law, combined with the
Court's observation that "the right of property in a slave is distinctly and
expressly affirmed in the Constitution.""' Whatever one might think of
that observation and of that reasoning, the Republican policy, it seemed,
was stymied by the Dred Scott ruling.
In his speeches, Lincoln sought to evade that conclusion by arguing
that the Supreme Court's reasoning in Dred Scott was so deeply and
flagrantly flawed that the conclusion against congressional power ought
not yet to be considered settled constitutional law, binding on other governmental branches that might conscientiously disagree."' It would be
perfectly in order, Lincoln implied, for Congress to try again with freesoil legislation for the territories, thus pressing the Court to reconsider.
This suggestion drew charges from Senator Douglas that it displayed a
dangerous tendency toward "mob law""' 3 (a view reminiscent, by the
way, of one that Lincoln himself had publicly declared some years earlier 1"4). Thus the stage was set for one of the most famous episodes in
the Lincoln-Douglas stump debates of 1858.
In the second debate, at Freeport, Illinois on August 27, Lincoln put
to Douglas the following question: "Can the people of a United States
Territory, in any lawful way, against the wish of any citizen of the
United States, exclude slavery from its limits prior to the formation of a
State constitution?" ' 15 The question probably was meant to pose a dangerous dilemma for Douglas. It seems that by answering "no," Douglas
would take two, related risks. First, a "no" answer would force Douglas
and his fellow Northern Democrats to forgo highfalutin appeals to a
111. 60 U.S. at 451-52. The Court referred to the fugitive slave clause, U.S. CONST art. 4, §2,
cl.3, and the thirty-year ban on congressional action respecting the importation of slaves. Id. art. I,
§ 1, cl.9. The Court went on to declare that the Constitution's affirmation of the said right
is done in plain words - too plain to be misunderstood. And no word can be found
in the Constitution which gives Congress a greater power over slave property, or
which entitles property of that kind to less protection than property of any other
description. The only power conferred is the power coupled with the duty of
guarding and protecting the owner in his rights.
Id. at 452.
112. See, e.g., 2 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 108, at 400-04 (Speech at Springfield, Illinois,
June 26, 1857).
113. See, e.g., 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 108, at 142-44 (Speech of Senator Douglas at
Jonesboro, Illinois, Sept. 15, 1858).
114. See I COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 108, at 112-13 (Address Before the Young Men's
Lyceum of Springfield, Ill., Jan 27, 1838).
115. See, e.g., 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 108, at 43 (Speech at Freeport, Ill., Aug. 27,
1858).
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principle of political self-determination ("popular sovereignty") as an
excuse for not opposing outright any further spread of slavery in the
territories.1 16 Second, a "no" answer would risk antagonizing the substantial numbers of free-soil minded Northerners who still, at that time,
retained their ties to the Democratic Party. On the other hand, a "yes"
answer to Lincoln's question might be equally dangerous for Douglas.
Not only would it undermine Douglas's charges against Lincoln of lawless disrespect for the Supreme Court; it also would tend to "split[ ]
Douglas from" his support among Southern-sympathizing Northern
Democrats.1 17
Douglas framed a response - it became known to history as his
"Freeport Doctrine," although he had uttered it repeatedly over the preceding several years - by which he hoped to avert the dilemma. The
Supreme Court's ruling against congressional and territorial legislation
directly excluding slavery, Douglas said, was certainly the law of the
land and had to be respected. However, that ruling had not stripped
territorial lawmakers of the means, should such be their choice, to keep
slave-holding out of their territories. The means they still retained,
Douglas said, was that of refusing to enact certain sorts of supportive
legal regulations that, experience showed, slaveholders needed in order
to make slavery a practically workable institution." 8 Examples might
be laws defining offenses of theft, trespass, and fraud in regard to dealings in slave property; or laws criminalizing disobedience of masters by
slaves, or exempting masters from ordinary tort liability in regard to the
treatment of slaves; or laws making it criminal to teach a slave to read or
providing for police intervention against assemblies of slaves otherwise
than under master's orders; or even laws prohibiting masters and others
from abusing slaves in ways believed likely to induce rebelliousness. A
full package of such laws would be what the politics of the time called a
slave code, and of course slave codes were in force in all of the slave
states.
Lincoln was not cowed by Douglas's response. His rejoinder to it
may have a remarkable ring to the ears of contemporary American constitutional lawyers. Here is some of what Lincoln said:
...I will ask you, my friends, if you were elected members of [a
territorial] Legislature, what would be the first thing you would have
to do before entering upon your duties? Swear to support the Consti116. See, e.g., 2 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 108, at 464 (Speech at Springfield, Ill., June

16, 1858).
117.

HARRY V.

JAFFA, CRISIS OF THE HOUSE DIVIDED: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE ISSUES IN

THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES

118. See 3
Freeport).

352 (1982).

COLLECTED WORKS,

supra note 108, at 51-52 (Douglas's reply to Lincoln at
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tution of the United States. Suppose you believe, as Judge Douglas
does, that the Constitution of the United States guaranties to your
neighbor the right to hold slaves in that Territory - that they are his
property - how can you clear your oaths unless you give him such
legislation as is necessary to enable him to enjoy that property? What
do you understand by supporting the Constitution . . .? Is it not to
give such Constitutional helps to the rights established by that Constitution as may be practically needed? ... Do you support the Constitution if, knowing or believing there is a right established under it
which needs specific legislation, you withhold that legislation? Do
you not violate and disregard your oath? I can conceive of nothing
plainer in the world....
Let me ask you why many of us who are opposed to slavery upon
principle, give our acquiescence to a Fugitive Slave law? Why do we
hold ourselves under obligations to pass such a law, and abide by it
when it is passed? Because the Constitution makes provision that the
owners of slaves shall have the right to reclaim them ...
...

....
[A]lthough it is distasteful to me, I have sworn to support the
Constitution, and having so sworn, I cannot conceive that I do support it if I withhold from that right [to have fugitive slaves "delivered
up"] any necessary legislation to make it practical. And if that is true
in regard to a Fugitive Slave law, is the right to have fugitive slaves
reclaimed any better fixed in the Constitution than the right to hold
slaves in the Territories?... [I]f I acknowledge, with Judge Douglas,
that this [Dred Scott] decision properly construes the Constitution, I
cannot conceive that I would be less than a perjured man if I should
refuse in Congress to give such protection to that property as in its
nature it needed.' 19
In sum and in effect, Lincoln argued that if slaveholding really is a constitutionally super-valued interest under our Constitution, as the
Supreme Court apparently had declared in Dred Scott, then Congress
stood under plain constitutional obligation to enact a slave code for the
territories.
Lincoln's response to Douglas thus stands as an uncanny, disturbing, ironic anticipation of the freedom-friendly state thesis. As you
will recall, the thesis (my words, now) is that "the Bill of Rights imposes
active obligations on the state, or government, to make sure that its
deployments of its special powers - including powers to decide from
time to time what the law is - are duly attuned to the aim of protecting
persons effectively against privately wrought infringements of their constitutionally super-valued interests." That is what Lincoln said by way
119. 3

1858).

COLLECTED WORKS, supra

note 108, at 130-32 (Speech at Jonesboro, Ill., Sept. 15,
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of retort to Douglas. I suppose it is obvious why we who sympathize
with Fiss might find this anticipation of Fiss by Lincoln disturbing, but I
am about to expand upon the point, in case it is not.
D.

Contingency in the Common Law?

What the example of Lincoln's retort to Douglas shows is that
opening the doors wide to bill of rights review of the common law is not
necessarily a gain for freedom or human rights. It depends on how well
the common law of the moment, and the leanings of the common-law
judiciary, stack up against your ideas of true human-rights ideals, as
compared with how well the Bill of Rights and the constitutional judiciary stack up. The point appears most clearly if we assume (as Lincoln
himself maintained was the case 20 ) that the 1850s American commonlaw default position, in the absence of relevant positive legislation on the
point, was anti-slavery or "free soil." On that understanding, a human
being could not lawfully be held as property in any given jurisdiction,
unless and until the common law in that jurisdiction had been altered
from its default or "natural" state, either by legislation or by the in-thetrenches work of the common-law judiciary. Assuming for the sake of
the argument that the Supreme Court in Dred Scott correctly had read
the American constitutional Bill of Rights to be positive legislation setting up the interest in slave-holding as constitutionally super-valued, 1"2 '
Lincoln's application of the freedom-friendly state thesis would, in this
instance, have obligated both territorial legislators and common-law
judges to work at supplanting the default free-soil doctrine of the common law with the rudiments, at least, of a slave code.12 2 In this particular historical context, application of the freedom-friendly state thesis to
bring common-law doctrine under review for compatibility with the Bill
of Rights would have been fraught with baleful consequences for human
rights, because, from a human rights standpoint, the common law was
fine and the Bill of Rights was deadly.
120. See 2 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 108, at 262-63 (Speech at Peoria, Ill., Oct. 16,
1854).
121. See note 111 supra and accompanying text.
122. The only apparent reason why application of the thesis would not have had exactly the
same effect within the free-soil states of the Union was that the first eight amendments were not at
that time considered to have any bearing on the laws of the states. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32
U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). Even so, Lincoln purported to believe that the Supreme Court soon
might rule that its slavery-protective doctrine was binding within the boundaries of the states. See,
e.g., 2 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 108, at 466-67 (Speech at Springfield, Ill., June 16, 1858).
A part of Lincoln's reason for this apprehension may have been the privileges and immunities
clause, U.S. CONST art IV, § 2. See, e.g., Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y. 562 (1860), where the New
York court rejected a plausible-looking claim to the effect that New York could not, consistently
with this clause, strip a slave-owner of his slave property by applying its law of personal freedom
to slaves being shipped through the port of New York from one slave jurisdiction to another.
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Has the bothersome twist passed away with the subsequent, radical
correction to our Bill of Rights? 12 3 Have our Constitution and its oracles
become so perfect? Yes, I am sure we all believe that the cause of
human rights was served well by denying L.B. Sullivan his shot at a
pound of the flesh of the New York Times Company. I wonder whether
we all are equally sure that Larry Flynt's human-rights claim was
stronger than Jerry Falwell's in the notorious case of the Campari parody. 124 Anyone who worries that Falwell did have a major human right
at stake may also be inclined to congratulate Virginia for its common
law vindicating that human right. Such a person even may be inclined to
doubt that the human-rights cause reaped a net gain when the Supreme
Court, in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,125 made Virginia's common law
take a back seat to Flynt's constitutionally super-valued interest in freedom of expression - or, if you prefer, to the set of public interests that
the super-valuation of Flynt's interest is very reasonably believed to

serve. 126
Another, timely and topical example is staring us in the face. Were
it only the good, old common law of property and contract with which
we had to deal, private universities today undoubtedly would have
rights, powers, and privileges to use race in any way they please - or at
any rate in any way geared to a policy of inclusion as opposed to exclusion' 27 - as a criterion for admissions decisions. As it happens, though,
there is a federal statute in force - Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964128 - that can, but need not necessarily, be read to have the effect,
for just about every private university in the country (excepting only
those willing to forgo all access to federal funds), of subordinating the
common-law freedom of private universities to classify by race to strictures paralleling those that the fourteenth amendment imposes on the use
of racial classifications by states. In Bakke,129 a Supreme Court majority
acted on the premise that such, indeed, is the command of Title VI, and
the aftermath has been no bed of roses for Brennan liberals, Justice
Brennan's own agreement with the premise notwithstanding.' 3 ° The
123. See U.S. CONST amends. 13, 14, 15.
124. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). The parody of a Campari ad
published by Flynt's magazine graphically imagined Falwell having sex with his mother in an
outhouse.

125. Id.
126. See supra text preceding notes 50-54 and text accompanying.
127. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2444 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); cf Singer,
supra note 93.
128. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq.
129. Regents of Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
130. See id. at 324, 328 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part).
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maverick judgment of Powell, J., saved our bacon then;. 3 ' but afterward,
owing to intervening changes in the Supreme Court's personnel and that
of lower federal courts, we entered a period of dread that the axe might
fall - as in fact it did in some parts of the country 1 32 - in the form of
judicial rulings flatly prohibiting any conscious consideration of race in
university admissions, in the name of the equal protection clause, made
applicable to private institutions by Title VI. Grutter 133 has let us off the
hook, but Grutter, we all feel, was a close shave. Constitutionally dictated reform of the common law is a pig in a poke, it seems - nothing
for Brennan liberals to welcome wholesale.
We could multiply examples. As a matter of the common law of
property and contract, private universities today undoubtedly have powers and privileges to impose restrictions on what they deem to be excessively uncivil, abusive, or harassing campus speech. Subject the
common law conferring those powers and privileges to bill-of-rights
evaluation, and the outcomes become much more clouded.' 34 Is everyone so sure - would Owen Fiss be sure - that human rights would be
35
the gainer?
In a famous decision of the 1960s, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey concluded that New Jersey's common law of trespass encompasses a privilege of entry for a lawyer whose job is to provide legal
services for farm workers and who needs to enter a farm in order to
consult with a client. 3 6 The court had been invited to rule in the defendant's favor on the basis that application of the common law of trespass
to convict him in these circumstances would have violated his rights
under the First Amendment. The court politely begged off from this
suggestion to bring New Jersey's common law under federal Bill of
131. See id. at 269 (opinion of Powell, J.)
132. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
133. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
134. The state law upheld in Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003), caught only utterances
that are found to have been specifically intended to convey a threat of physical harm. Arguably,
the same or an allied principle would allow a university to penalize utterances found to have been
specifically intended to produce severe emotional distress and thereby to obstruct, hinder or deter
a person from free and full participation in campus activities, even if not to convey a threat of
physical harm. The matter, however, is hardly free from doubt.
135. See, e.g., Fiss, Many Faces, supra note 47, at 5-6 (recapitulating sympathetically the
"silencing" argument in defense of the constitutional permissibility of hate-speech regulation);
Owen Fiss, The Right Kind of Neutrality, in Fiss, LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 50, at 111

(same).
136. See State v. Shack, 58 N.J. 297, 277 A.2d 369 (1971). The defendants were charged
under a statute providing that "[any person who trespasses on any lands ... after being forbidden
so to trespass by the owner... is a disorderly person and shall be punished by a fine of not more
than $50." 277 A.2d at 370. The statute contained no special definition of trespass, and the
Court's opinion plainly deals with trespass as a common law doctrine.
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Rights scrutiny.137 If you want to speculate about why, ask yourself
how certain you are that New Jersey's common law rule with the privilege could have withstood attack as a violation of the farm owner's
Fourteenth Amendment right not to be deprived of property without due
138
process of law.
Full-blast exposure of the common law to bill of rights scrutiny, I
am suggesting, could prove to be a mixed bag from the standpoint of any
given observer's conception of human rights and human freedom, and
that would hold for "liberal" as well as for "conservative" observers.
The point is structural and endemic. In the elegant terms offered by
Professor Van der Walt, the possibility that cannot ever be erased is that
horizontal application of fundamental rights, historically the most
recent and systematically the final way in which the law can be
revised in terms of the public interest . . . itself become[s] privatised
by privatising interpretations 39of what a fundamental right means
under specific circumstances.1
We have no reason, adds Van der Walt, to assume that "the subordination of economic to political power at which the horizontal application
140
of fundamental rights aims, can be achieved."
Viewing the scene from a slightly different angle, one easily might
bring it under coverage of a thesis advanced by Mark Tushnet in his
book Taking the Constitution Away From the Courts.14 1 "On balance,"
Tushnet concludes in that book, "judicial review [of statutes] may have
some effect in offsetting legislators' inattention to constitutional values"
and "the effect is not obviously good."'' 42 Allow me to unpack that.
Insofar as Americans rely on judicial review to give effect to constitutional values, constitutional values are, to all practical intents and pur137. See 177 A.2d at 371-72.
138. You might have been certain it could after the Supreme Court's decision in PruneYard
Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), but the Court's 1972 decision in Lloyd Corp. v.
Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, would not have left you confident at all. In Lloyd Corp., the Supreme
Court rejected a claim that the respondents had a constitutionally protected right to leaflet at the
petitioner's shopping center, using language suggesting that state common law upholding the
respondents' side of the controversy might have been in constitutional difficulty. "The Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are also relevant to this case," the Court
wrote. 'They provide that 'no person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.' There is the further proscription in the Fifth Amendment against the taking
of 'private property ... for public use, without just compensation.' ....
We do say that the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights of private property owners, as well as the First Amendment
rights of all citizens, must be respected and protected." Id. at 567, 570.
139. Van der Walt, FUTURITY, supra note 72, at 102. In the South African debates, "horizontal
application" means application of bill-of-rights norms to cases involving only private parties and
common law.
140. Id. at 110.
141. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUnON AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
142. Id. at 153.
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poses, exactly those values that Supreme Court majorities from time to
time advance in the name of the Bill of Rights. Hence, the expenditure
limits struck down in Buckley,' 4 3 the minority preferences struck down
in Croson'" and Adarand,145 the bakers' hours law struck down in
Lochner,'4 6 all did indeed reflect contempt by their authors of constitutional values. And yet the effect of having all these contemptuous laws
struck down "is not obviously good," I daresay, in the eyes of everyone
reading this.
Thus Tushnet's lesson: When we expose legislation to judicial constitutional review, we take our chances on the superiority or preferability, in our eyes, of constitutional values as rendered by the reviewing
court to the values that actuate the legislature. There is no self-evident
reason to suppose, or to hope, that the same does not hold if we substitute "expose common law doctrine" for "expose legislation" and "the
values that actuate common law decisionmaking" for "the values that
actuate the legislature." Or is there?

IV.

THE DIGNITY OF THE COMMON LAW?

A.

The Question Posed

Part III identifies a purely pragmatic reason why Brennan liberals,
in the United States today, might feel some caution about the idea of
throwing all of the common law wide open to judicial constitutional
review. Being pragmatic, the reason also is situational and contingent.
It counsels you to choose based on your level of confidence in the
Supreme Court's propensity to enforce, in the name of our country's
constitutional Bill of Rights, a set of values that you will find preferable
to some other set that you think more typically will drive the work of
common law courts in the states. If you don't especially trust the
Supreme Court in that regard - as a Mark Tushnet, perhaps, would not
- then maybe you won't be an enthusiast for judicial constitutional
review of the common law. But then ought you not - like Tushnet be feeling similar doubts about judicial constitutional review of statutes?
Suppose we observed some fraction of a country's legal intelligentsia evincing a level of uneasiness about exposing statutes to judicial
review. A general mistrust on their part of the likely "tilt," let us call it,
of the work of the constitutional judiciary might possibly (it certainly
would not necessarily) be lying behind their qualms. Notice that the
mistrust could be directed to any or all of (1) the constitutional judges
143.
144.
145.
146.

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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themselves (their supposed or perceived ideological leanings); (2) the
perceived normative content of the specific constitutional instrument
that will serve as their special charter; and (3) the judgmental procedures
("interest-balancing" for example) that judges are expected to use in
applying constitutional content to cases. 147 And what if we observed,
among this same skeptical fraction, a comparable unease about exposing
the common law to the corrective gaze of a constitutional judiciary?
Any or all of the mentioned kinds of mistrust could explain that attitude,
too. But here is one thing that it may seem none of these kinds of mistrust, alone or together, could suffice to explain: a distinct unease about
subjecting the common law to correction by judges acting in the Constitution's name. Now, this is exactly what we do observe, in some
quarters, both in the United States 4 ' and in South Africa.
B.

South African Views

Had the Alabama legislature, by statute, enacted exactly the defamation rule invoked by L. B. Sullivan against the New York Times, there
could have been no doubt that a court must scrutinize that rule for constitutional acceptability before using it to impose any sort of burdensome consequence on a speaker, for speaking. Could the conclusion
conceivably be different just because the same state rule of law is judgemade rather than legislatively enacted? The Warren Court easily
answered no,' 4 9 but a glance at the South African scene suggests that the
matter may be less simple than they let on.
As we dig into this question, it will be well to bear in mind that as frequently has been noted - human-rights claims often if not typically are in play on both sides of a common-law case.' 50 We have to
acknowledge this, even if some of the human-rights claims sometimes in
contention may be ones that you or I or whoever might not rank especially high - maybe Jerry Falwell's dignitary claim, or maybe Larry
Flynt's claim to freedom to spew forth whatever enters his head, or
maybe some landowner's claim to exclusive control over his property,
lawfully acquired. There are bound to be cases in which you will concede that the claims on both sides are weighty: Carmichele, perhaps,
where the inevitable (and intended!) consequence of imposing the pres147. Compare the views of Derek Van der Merwe discussed infra text accompanying notes
169-82.
148. See Part IA.
149. See text accompanying note 8, supra.
150. See, e.g., Ellmann, supra note 44, at 50-54; Sprigman & Osborne, supra note 27, at 42;
Van der Walt, Futurryr, supra note 72, at 111 ("The horizontal application of the constitution
confronts us without exception with a conflict between two fundamental rights or two
interpretations of what a particular fundamental right means under specific circumstances.").
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sure of liability-risk on prosecutors and police will be a higher rate of
bail refusals and pre-trial detentions of - as it sometimes must happen
- innocent accuseds. Of course, in no class of cases is the collision of
human rights more evident than in defamation cases.
Keeping this point about conflicting human-right claims in mind,
the question is whether one possibly could believe that common law
decision-making by judges should systematically be regarded with less
suspicion than statutory rule-making by legislatures; suspicion, I mean,
of "inattention," as Professor Tushnet calls it, to some set of values maybe "constitutional values" - that you or I might wish would be
normatively commanding for whoever is in charge. 15 1 The question, for
example, is whether a common law defamation rule might strike us as
primafacie less open to suspicion of the inattention offense than would
the exact same rule if enacted by a legislature. Motive, after all - or
process, or good faith - may sometimes save the legitimacy of an act
we regard as mistaken on the merits but only, as it were, by bad luck.1" 2
Might one, perhaps, see the two processes - parliamentary and adjudicative - as characteristically driven by different sets of motivations?
For example, one might see the mixes of "reason" and "will" in the two
forums as being markedly different. 53 One might think of parliaments
as likelier than courts to be sites of unrestrained, partisan power struggles, or of exhibitionist posturing. 154 One might think of the common
law as an accumulative product of sincere applications of reason by generations of judges - an "interpretive community," we might call
them15 5 - specially trained to the task, and specially imbued with the
values of a tradition in which the right human rights ideals - or call
them "our public values" 1 5 6 - are constantly and aptly influential.
One would then, to be sure, be taking quite a rosy view of common
law adjudication. Bear with it, though; even take it one step further. Is
it beyond imagining that you would sometimes think of the animating
human rights ideals of your country's constitutional bill of rights as
being essentially continuous with a human rights tradition ensconced in
your country's historical, common law corpus juris? These ideals would
151. Compare text accompanying note 142 supra.
L. REV. 739, 747-49 (1982).
152. See Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation,34 STAAN.
153. See Paul W. Kahn, Reason and Will in the Origins of American Constitutionalism, 98
YALE L.J. 449 (1989).
154. But see John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, ConstitutionalAdjudication: Lessons From
Europe, TEX. L. REv. (forthcoming 2004) (suggesting that appointment of U.S. federal judges for
life, by majoritarian - as opposed to supermajoritarian - procedures, may help tempt some
judges to "speak to external audiences in their own names" rather than keep their public judicial
identities merged with with those of their courts, or of the judiciary, collectively).
155. See Fiss, supra note 152, at 745.
156. See Owen M. Fiss, The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1, 2 (1979).
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belong to the set, again so to call it (it's not a phrase I choose by accident), of your country's public values. 57 Thus perceiving the set to
encompass both constitutional and common law values, principles, or
ideals, you might sometimes think of testing the constitutionality of a
questioned statutory solution to a rights controversy by looking to see
how the statute's specific dictates and implicit principles compare with
those of the extant and historic common-law solutions - as, in fact, the
58
Constitutional Court of South Africa has done from time to time.
None of this would mean you were willing to exempt common law solutions categorically from bill of rights inspection, but it does suggest how
you might feel some degree of caution about inviting the constitutional
judiciary to go mucking around too freely with the common law.
In South Africa, where constitutional drafters and judges have
thrown over the traces when it comes to exempting common law solutions categorically from bill-of-rights inspection, 59 the stance of caution
I have just mentioned is not infrequently visible - in academic commentaries, in the work of the common-law judiciary inspecting doctrine
with respect to the "spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill of Rights," and
in the conduct and posture of the Constitutional Court. 60 Start with the
academics. Some brood over what they call constitutional "invasions"
of the common law. 1 ' Johan Van der Walt, a decidedly transformationminded scholar, finds himself in some sympathy with judges and legal
academics whose "professional identities," he says - presumably out of
direct, personal knowledge - have been shaped by "common-law traditions and institutions," and who, in consequence, experience constitutional reinspection of the common law as "a threat to the integrity of
existing legal principles and institutions."'' 62 Professor Van der Walt is
not uncritical of this defensive tendency, but neither is he clear of it. He
is not keen about the prospect of the common-law's undergoing formal
correction under the constitutional lash. 163 He shrinks from seeing the
157. Compare Jordan v. State, 2002 (11) BCLR 1117 (CC) U 102-04 (opinion of O'Regan and
Sachs JJ), where two justices dealt with a party's proposition that the Constitution bars the state
from criminalizing anyone's exercise of liberty (in this case, to maintain a brothel) for the sake of
a "particular" or "private" moral code. The justices asserted that the Constitution does not debar
the state from enforcing "civic" morality. "Indeed," the justices wrote, "the Bill of Rights is

nothing if not a document founded on deep civic morality.

Id.

104.

158. See infra text accompanying notes 204-15.

159. See Part IB.
160. See, e.g., Jeremy Sarkin, The Common Law in South Africa: Pro-Apartheid or ProDemocracy, 23 HAsTINGs INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 1, 21 (1999) (speaking of the Constitutional
Court's "reluctance to drastically transform the common law").
161. See P.J. Visser, A Successful Constitutional Invasion of Private Law, 58 J. FOR
CONTEMpORARY RoMAN-DUTCH LAW 745 (1995).

162. Van der Walt, Co-operative Relation, supra note 12, at 359.
163. See id. at 355.
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common law "indicted" from the outside, by a constitution or a constitutional ministry that would claim to offer protection for rights that (they
may too hastily suppose) are not already protected by the common law;
or at any rate are not already protectible by methods indigenous to the
common law, applied to normative resources contained within it.1 64 He
senses that such an antagonistic way of framing the transaction between
the constitution and the common law poses a danger not just to the to the
integrity but to the dignity and the standing of the law in general and its
image in South Africa.
But Professor Van der Walt is ambivalent. He is ideologically left,
reformist, "progressive." '6 5 He affirms a possible, if not logically certain, need - regrettable as it may be - for some measure of conscious
"constitutional intervention into common-law jurisprudence."' 166 Perhaps the need could be averted, Van der Walt suggests, if the common
law judiciary could come to see constitutional law as a collaborator, not
an adversary; if common law theorists could stop regarding the domains
of law and of constitutional politics as mutually sealed off by a vacuum
boundary that a judge could not heed without "insulat[ing] aspects of
law or social life" from normatively worthy "constitutional imperatives."1 67 In Van der Walt's preferred vision, constitutional law and
common law are two moments in a single process of conversation and
"creative tension."'' 68 Their relation, in the end, becomes "cooperative."
Ambivalence in a different key appears in the work of Van der
Walt's colleague and distinguished private-law scholar, Derek Van der
Merwe. Like Van der Walt, Van der Merwe worries that "constitutional
colonisation" of the common law (as he not too cheerily dubs the process) poses a danger to institutional integrity.1 69 But whereas Professor
Van der Walt voices concern about the effects of constitutional vs. common law trench warfare on the integrity and standing of the institution of
law as a whole - or I suppose we might call it legality or the rule of
164. Id. Van der Walt is not suggesting that the Constitution's Bill of Rights is deviant in
substance from what it ought ideally to be. He is suggesting that neither (in general tendency) is
the common law. For example, "a thorough application of the substantive principles of the
common law of delict could have achieved everything the constitution could have required it to
achieve in the case of Carmichele," because "after all, the rights to dignity, life, and freedom and
security of the person have all along been part and parcel of the South African common law."
Van der Walt, Threshold, supra note 12, at 519, 524.
165. See, e.g., id. at 521 n.8.
166. Van der Walt, Co-operative Relation, supra note 12, at 362.
167. Id. at 355; Al Katz, Studies in Boundary Theory: Three Essays in Adjudication and
Politics, 28 BuFF. L. REV. 383 (1979) (on "live" and "vacuum" boundaries").
168. Id.
169. See Derek Van der Merwe, ConstitutionalColonisation of the Common Law: A Problem
of InstitutionalIntegrity, TSAR 2000-2, at 12.
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law - Dean Van der Merwe is concerned in a more pointed way about
the possible triumph of constitutional law over common law. 170 More
precisely, he is concerned about occupation of the entire field of legalnormative decision-making by a discursive modality (or "style of argument"' 71 ) that he sees as distinctive to constitutional law, displacing one
that he sees both as native to common law and, I think it fair to add, as
more abstruse and tenderer than the frankly instrumentalist style of constitutional debate. Van der Merwe is afraid that common-law argument
will end up as 2constitutional argument - meaning "policy" argument
-

' 17
"in drag."

Legal-doctrinal argument is one thing, Van der Merwe maintains,
while policy or political debate (of which constitutional argument is a
subset) is another. The former proceeds against a conventional, preestablished background set of ideas and categories, a distinctively legal
grammar that injects into the facts and events that compose a legal case
their distinctly legal significance, thus shielding legal decision off from
raw, consequentialist calculation. Doctrinal argument is a method, then,
by which practitioners work out the legally best or aptest shadings and
orderings of shared, permanent principles in changing contexts, where
"legally" connotes a time-tested, evolving, civilizational wisdom that no3
7
sheerly instrumentalist or "balancing" calculus ever could capture.
By contrast, political, including constitutional argument involves the
parties in an open, unmediated contest of clashing interests and rights174
claims that only a trade-off could resolve.
Van der Merwe is not anti-political, anti-constitutional, or anti-consequentialist. Both the legal and the political component have their
place, he maintains, in an entire, good institutional order. South Africa's
Bill of Rights is not wrong or inept; it is fine, welcome, and overdue.
Only, it is not law. Granting that the values animating constitutional law
(so-called) may be consonant with those of the law proper, the grammar
of constitutional-legal argument is incorrigibly that of politics, not
law.' 7 5 The point is, the country needs both the frank consequentialism
for which the Constitution speaks and the cunning-of-reason of the common law. Both should be preserved, and the way to preserve both is to
keep their respective, institutional domains vacuum-bounded from each
other - exactly what Van der Walt preaches against. 176 If the political
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

See id. at 14, 29, 31.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 22-25.
See id. at 14.
See id. at 26.
Van der Merwe criticizes Van der Walt expressly on this account. See id. at 27.
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and policy concerns of constitutional debate are allowed to poach in the
delicate common-law environment, they will overcome and destroy it, to
the country's great loss. Failure to achieve in institutional practice "the
distinct but complementary natures of common law argument and constitutional argument" will end, deplorably, by "collaps[ing] law into
politics" or "policy."' 7 7 (Van der Merwe expresses no worry that the
collapse might occur in the opposite direction, but some other South
African lawyers and jurists do. 17 8 )
The disagreement between Van der Walt and Van der Merwe suggests that something of moment may, after all, hinge on the choice
between "direct" and "indirect" application of the Bill of Rights to private disputes for which the rules of decision are supplied by the common
law. 179 Van der Merwe's argument objects specifically (in effect) to
indirect application. Indirect application means subjection of common
law doctrine to revision under the Constitution's gaze, and that is an
operation that cannot - Van der Merwe maintains - be carried out
without corrupting the common law developmental process with an alien
form of discourse and reasoning. Direct application, by contrast, should
raise no such concern. In Van der Merwe's view (which, remember,
commends the Constitution on the merits), there should be no problem,
for example, in a court's interdicting1 80 a person from proceeding with
an activity - including the pleading of a claim or defense in a lawsuit
- that the court finds would break the Constitution by inflicting an
unjustified incursion on a constitutionally protected interest of another.
Yes, the defendant's interdicted activity may appear to be legally privileged - or the claim or defense he pleads may appear to be authorized
- by extant common law doctrine, so interdicting him cannot be harmonious with that doctrine, instrumentally speaking. But if done strictly
on the ground that the Constitution amounts to direct, positive, paramount legislation against what the defendant is doing, the interdict
leaves the common law where it was, unmolested and free to respond to
the situation in whatever way common law discourse and reasoning may
recommend.
In that sense, at least - and it's a sense that matters much to Van
177. Id. at 29, 31.
178. See, e.g., Serjeant-at-the-Bar, infra note 195. See also http://www.bday.co.za/bday/con
tent/directl1,3523,1402443-6079-0,00.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2003), reporting a law professor's
objection to the use of lawyers as part-time, acting judges in the labor courts, because the parttimers "at times seem to compete with the high court as a common law bench. They appear to
ignore the protective elements of the new SA labor laws, which are central to the new
dispensation."
179. See Part IB.
180. I use the South African term for an injunction.
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der Merwe - direct application leaves the common law with its integrity and identity unscathed, whereas indirect application invades
them.18 1 It seems that Van der Walt's view would be quite different. He
is in favor of express, free-flowing, both-ways exchange between constitutional and common law argumentation, preferring that the laboring oar
should be taken by the common law side whenever the two come into
apparent contact. As we'll soon see, there is a match between that preference and certain institutional aspects of the Constitutional Court's
82
management of the indirect-application process.
Ambivalence regarding constitutionally driven reform of the common law has not been confined to the scholar's den; it has affected the
working judiciary, too. At the level of the High Courts, there were early
signs of resistance (not universally shared) to the idea that the common
law might stand normatively in need of correction under constraint of
the Bill of Rights.' 8 3 For example, in an early case raising the question
of whether the free-expression guarantee in the Bill of Rights might possibly be violated by a plaintiff's invocation of the common law of defamation against a public-figure defendant (where the law allowed no
defense of absence of malice), a judge expressed his qualms regarding
what he called a looming "constitutional invasion" of the common law.
He could not, the judge wrote,
imagine that the drafters of the Constitution intended the whole body
of our private law to become unsettled. Are we to see the invasion of
private property justified by the trespasser on the strength of the right
to freedom of movement (section 18184) or the right to freely choose
a place of residence anywhere in the national territory (section
181. On my reading of it, Van der Merwe's view is exactly contrary to the view of some South
African private lawyers that H.A. Strydom reported (but did not endorse) in The private domain
and the bill of rights, [1995] 10 SAPR/PL 52. What concerned the private lawyers, Strydom
wrote, was that "a direct [as opposed to an indirect] application may endanger the self-reliant and
distinctive quality of private law by letting it be owerawed by public law concerns associated with
the constitutional rights." Id. At 60. Strydom went on immediately to deny that such a result
would be "an inevitability.... The fact that a private law issue has been taken up in a document
such as a constitution does not transform the private law issue into a public law one," id. - a
view that accords with Van der Merwe's as I understand it.
182. See infra note 203 and text accompanying.
183. For examples of more positively receptive, early responses from High Court judges, see
Holomisa v. Argus Newspapers Ltd, 1996 (6) BCLR 836 (W) (Cameron, J.) (considering the
bearing on the common law of defamation of constitutional guarantees respecting dignity and
freedom of expression); Gardener v. Whitaker, 1994 (5) BCLR 19 (E), 1994 SACLR LEXIS 284
(Froneman, J.) (same), application for leave to appeal dismissed, 1996 (6) BCLR 775 (CC);
Ryland v. Edros, 1997 (1) BCLR 77 (Farlam, J.) (described infra text accompanying notes 199-

200).
184. See SA CONST., 1993, § 18 (guaranteeing everyone a right of freedom of movement
throughout the country).
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19185)? Surely this was not intended. There was no need for constitutional invasion of the private law. Parliament186is empowered to alter
the existing law wherever the shoe pinches.
In another early judgment, written in Afrikaans, an English-language summary included in the report records the judge relying on the
"established principle" that "the legislature [does] not intend to amend
the common law more than [is] absolutely necessary, and that legislative
amendments of the common law must be expressed in the clearest possible terms."' 87 (The Constitution, remember, is a statute.' 8 8 ) Courts
ought to construe the new Constitution - specifically, with regard to
the question of horizontal application of its Bill of Rights - according
to the established, statutory-interpretative principle of looking for the
mischief to be remedied. In this case, that mischief is not the common
law but rather is "the previous constitutional system.' ' 8 9 Moreover, this
truth has not
been sufficiently recognised in those judgments which [have] held
fundamental rights provisions to apply horizontally. It [has] been
observed that a great deal of South African law was uncontaminated
by the oppressive and discriminatory policy of the previous regime.
The common law contain[s] adequate remedies and [is] a comprehensive system of well defined and equitably limited rights and obligations including in essence those rights entrenched in Chapter 3 of the
Constitution. The Constitution [does] not demand a radical break
with all the legal traditions of the past. Sweeping changes to the law
ought not to be made lightly. 190
Accordingly, the judge could see no basis for a conclusion that "the

framers of the Constitution . . . intended that the spirit, purport and

objects of [the Bill of Rights are] to extend the fundamental rights
beyond those circumstances for which the common law made
provision." 19 '
As we have seen, such early, resistant judgments have been overtaken by clear endorsement, both by the "final" constitutional framers
and the Constitutional Court, of a standing judicial duty of reinspection
of the common law having due regard to Bill of Rights norms. 192 The
promptings behind the early hesitation have not entirely disappeared
185.
186.
187.
*6.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

See id. § 19.
De Klerk v. Du Plessis, 1994 (6) BCLR 124 (T), 1994 SACLR LEXIS 244, at *26.
Potgieter en 'n Ander v Kilian,1995 (11) BCLR 1498 (N); 1995 SACLR LEXIS 272, at
See supra note 23.
Potgeiter, 1995 SACLR LEXIS 272, at *7.

Id.
Id.
See Part lB.
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from view, however; they continue to influence not only academic opinion (as we have seen) but judicial work.
At the level of the SCA, we observe not just Old Guard judges but
more recent appointees of the ANC government speaking respectfully of
"freedom of contract" and its relation to human dignity. 193 We observe
them, therefore, refusing to cast any general cloud of doubt over common-law contract rules, including some that certain American judges of
recent times might have found in need of modification in order truly to
honor a constitutional guarantee not only of everyone's "equality before
the law" but also everyone's enjoyment of the "equal benefit of the
law."' 9 4 According to an account offered by an approving commentator,
the judges of the SCA have recognized that "rules of contract, delict
[i.e., tort], and succession, developed over centuries[,] hold much
value." In the commentator's view, the body of common law rules represents not only "a collective wisdom built over centuries" that the Con-

stitution aims to "redeem," but "a set of rational concepts, the content of
which my alter as values change incrementally over time. '"195
But why speak of "redeeming" the common law's wisdom and
rationality? Because, the commentator says, South Africa's common
law underwent a period of pollution by apartheid and racist rule, and it
contains, in consequence, some matter that is incompatible with basic
commitments of the new Constitution. 96 Such an observation would
match up well with other recent cases in which common-law judges
rather dramatically have overturned racist or otherwise perceivedly discriminatory precedent, sometimes avowedly in response to constitutional
pressure and sometimes not. In one such case, the SCA, explicitly
193. See Brisley v. Drotsky, 2002 (12) BCLR 1229 (SCA). The Brisley case involved an
attack on the common law doctrine giving effect to clauses in written contracts that prohibit any
subsequent variation of the parties' obligations except by an instrument in writing. Cameron, JA,
concurring in a unanimous judgment upholding the doctrine, remarked that "the Constitution's
values of dignity and equality and freedom require that the courts approach their task of striking
down contracts or declining to enforce them with perceptive restraint. One of the reasons ... is
that contractual autonomy is part of freedom. Shorn of its obscene excesses [citing Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)], contractual autonomy informs also the constitutional value of
dignity." Id. 94.
194. SA CoNsT. § 9(1).
195. See Serjeant at the Bar, "Common law should not be discarded," Mail & Guardian online,
Tuesday, Mar. 9, 2004, http://www.mg.za/Content/13.asp?ao=32338 (last visited Mar. 9, 2004).
A (presumably different) commentator writing under the same alias eight months previously had a
decidedly different view. See Serjeant at the Bar, "A transformed judiciary needs transformed
minds," Mail & Guardian online, 17 April 2003, http://www.mg.co.za/Content/13.asp?o=18889&
sa=19 (last visited July 7, 2003), citing both the Brisley and Afrox cases as evidence of "a
continued affection for a common law that remains incongruent with the spirit of the
Constitution," a lapse that that "Serjeant" blames on the state's failure adequately to address "the
problem of a judiciary that reflects the nation's demography."
196. "Common law should not be discarded," supra note 195.
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adverting to a constitutional anti-discrimination clause that includes sexual orientation among the "suspect" axes of classification, 97 extended
the common law tort action for loss of support to include claims by
same-sex partners in long-term, committed relationships.1 98 Another
notable set of cases has involved financial claims of wives against husbands or ex-husbands, arising under customary-form Islamic marriages.
The old precedents denied enforcement of such claims on the theory that
Islamic marriages are contractual in nature but, being by custom "potentially" polygamous, are contra bonos mores and therefore give rise to no
judicially cognizable entitlement. 99 Those precedents have been sent
packing, although the most authoritative decision discarding them could
itself be read as evincing a trace of resistance to the idea that the common law and its processes may sometimes stand in need of radical correction under the dictate of an undisguisedly political intervention (such
being what the new South African Bill of Rights undoubtedly is, however universalist in inspiration, or otherwise admirable, we also may
consider its content to be). The leading decision from the SCA makes a
major point of insisting that the doctrinal revision it pronounces has
occurred strictly within the confines of common-law jurisprudence. 2°
The court, it seems, wished to avoid having the common law be seen in
public as undergoing chastisement from an outside, paramount force.
Apparently, it preferred - just as Professor Van der Walt prefers 20 1 the image of the common law redemptive, the common law cleaning up
its own act as the common law is capable of doing.
And what of the Constitutional Court? The CC, although evidently
possessed of jurisdiction to impose its own, detailed views of exactly
how common law doctrine ought optimally to be attuned to the "spirit,
purport, and objects" of the Bill of Rights,2 °2 has opted, thus far, to
channel that work to the country's common-law judiciary, subject to its
own, final power of review. The Court has explained that choice in
197. See SA CONST. § 9(3).
198. Du Plessis v. Road Accident Fund, 2003 (11) BCLR 1220 (SCA), 2003 SACLR LEXIS
42.
199. See Ismail v Ismail 1983 (1) SA 1006 (A).
200. See Amod v. Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund, 1998 (10) BCLR 1207 (CC)
30, 1998 SACLR LEXIS 59. Contrast Ryland v. Edros, 1997 (1) BCLR 77 (1997 (C), where a
High Court judge invoked Bill of Rights values and the command of SA CONST. § 39(2) as his
warrant for reforming the prior application of the boni mores doctrine to this line of cases.
201. See note 164, supra, and text accompanying.

202. See SA CONST. § 167(3)(a) ("The Constitutional Court ... is the highest court in all
constitutional matters"); id. § 39(2) ("[W]hen developing the common law or customary law,
every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights");
id. § 173 ("The Constitutional Court, Supreme Court of Appeal and High Courts have the inherent
power to protect and regulate their own process, and to develop the common law, taking into

account the interests of justice.")
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terms of regard for the integrity of the common law and for the experise
20 3
of its ministry.

Finally, let us not overlook the repeated occurrence in the judgments of the Constitutional Court, which I already have mentioned, of
referrals to the common law as a source of standards against which to
test statutes for alleged bill of rights/human-rights violations. This is
South Africa, remember, where the general course of common-law adjudication during the half-century preceding the advent of the Bill of

Rights is not especially admired. 2° And the judges of whom I speak are
not a reactionary bunch - far, far from it! Neverthless, consider what
we find.
In an early case testing the boundaries of the right of privacy
granted by section 13 of the Interim Constitution (invoked by a company
officer resisting production of financial records), the CC looked to several sources for guidance, including the South African common law of
privacy.20 5 The Court warned that "[c]aution must be exercised when

attempting to project common law principles onto the interpretation of

fundamental [constitutional] rights,' 2°6 but the reason it gave for its
warning suggested no general qualms about the common law's normative reliability in the field of rights-definition. °7
203. See Du Plessis v. De Klerk, 1996 (5) BCLR 658 (CC) 1 50, 57-60, 1996 SACLR LEXIS
1; Gardener v. Whitaker, 1996 (6) BCLR 775 (CC) 16; Amod, 1998 (10) BCLR 1207, [ 30-33;
De Freitas v. Soc'y of Advocates of Natal, 1998 (11) BCLR 1345 (CC)
19-21, 1998 SACLR
LEXIS 52; Carmichele v. Minister of Safety & Sec., 2001 (10) BCLR 995 (CC), 2001 SACLR
LEXIS 64, 1 50-58; Fourie v. Minister of Home Affairs, 2003 (10) BCLR 1092 (CC), 2003
SACLR LEXIS 45,
12-13. The posture of referral to the SCA seems noticeably less
pronounced in cases of constitutional challenge to common law doctrines imposing criminal
responsibility or setting evidentiary and procedural rules for criminal prosecutions. See, e.g.,
Thebus v. The State, 2003 (10) BCLR 1100 (CC), 2003 SACLR LEXIS 46, where the CC gave
what looks like a plenary review to an SCA ruling upholding an application of the common law
doctrine of "common purpose" (compare "conspiracy") to hold an accused responsible for a
crime.
204. See, e.g., DAVID DYZENHAUS, HARD CASES IN WICKED LEGAL SYSTEMS: SouTH AFRICAN
LAW IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (1991) (also finding, however, that South
African common law continued through the apartheid era to reflect natural-justice elements worth
preserving).
205. See Bernstein et al. v. Bester NO, 1996 (4) BCLR 449 (CC) U 68-71, 1996 SACLR
LEXIS 3.
206. Id. 71.
207. The Court pointed to a significant difference in the respective orders of march in common
law and constitutional litigation. In common law litigation, there is no separation between the
question whether the plaintiff has suffered an infringement of his or legal right by reason of the
defendant's act and the question whether the defendant's act was wrongful in a legal sense. The
Constitution, by contrast, expressly permits the state to "limit" constitutionally enumerated rights
when a proportionate justification for doing so can be shown. See SA CONST., 1993, § 33(1);
State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (6) BCLR 645 (CC) 104, 1995 SACLR LEXIS 218 (introducing the
proportionality test). Therefore, the Court implied, the constitutionally enumerated right of
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In its very first announced decision, State v. Zuma,2 °8 the CC had to
decide whether an apartheid era statute could survive the fair trial guarantee in section 25 of the new Bill of Rights. 20 9 The statute placed the
burden on a criminal accused, in certain circumstances, to establish that
a confession had not been coerced. The Court noted that a presumption
of innocence and concomitant right of silence had been basic principles
in South African common law for over 150 years, prior to undergoing
"erosion" under the apartheid regime.2 1 1 In the authentic, pre-corrupted
South African common law tradition, a requirement that the prosecution
prove a disputed confession's voluntariness had been considered a clear
implication from an underlying principle (or "golden thread") to the
effect that conviction of crime may come only upon the prosecution's
proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The CC accordingly considered the common law rule on burden of proof regarding the voluntariness of a confession not only to supply a part of the "background" to
section 25 but itself to form a "part of the right to a fair trial" guaranteed
by section 25.21
The Court's treatment of the common law in Zuma is matched by a
reflection voiced not long thereafter by one of its members, Justice Albie
Sachs. "[O]ur jurisprudence has many admirable features," Sachs wrote,
but has not always evolved in the direction of supporting openness
and democracy, hence the need for selective utilization of decisions
by our courts; the deference which courts normally give to "political
acts" and to legislative outcomes of the democratic process, might be
more tenuous in the case of decisions and legislation of the pre-democratic period; and we might be required to use a wider range of
source material than traditionally has been the case.2 12
A like sentiment informed Sachs's response to a case 2 13 pitting the
Interim Constitution's guarantees against compelled self-incrimination,
in sections 25(2)(c) and 25(3)(d), against a statutory demand for testimony by a company officer before an insolvency master. A right
against self-incrimination has ancient roots in English (and, by adoption,
South African) common law, but Sachs noted that acceptance of legislaprivacy might warrant being given a more expansive prima facie range of application than its
common law counterpart necessarily would suggest. See id.
208. 1995 (4) BCLR 401 (SA), 1995 SACLR LEXIS 219.
209. SA Const., 1993, § 25. Section 25(3)(c) specifically grants rights "to be presumed
innocent and to remain silent during plea proceedings or trial and not to testify during trial," but
the text does not specifically address the "reverse onus" issue presented in Zuma.
210. Id. 12.
211. Id. IN 12, 33.
212. Coetzee v. Gov't of the Republic of South Africa, 1995 (10) BCLR 1382 (CC) 46 n.44,
1995 SACLR LEXIS 275 (Sachs, J.).
213. See Ferreira v. Levin NO, 1996 (1) BCLR 1 (CC), 1996 SACLR LEXIS 2.
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tive interference with the right in the context of a company insolvency
"is almost as old as the right itself. ' ' 21 4 Of course, that fact of acceptance
- which arose in a context of full parliamentary sovereignty - would
not by itself settle whether such interference can be justified in the new
constitutional order. "Nevertheless," Sachs wrote,
the well-established nature of the legislative exception, both in our
country and abroad, when measured against the relatively inchoate
and adaptive nature of the common-law principle, indicates that it
could well pass the test at least of reasonableness and justifiability.
In S v Zuma, . . . Kentridge AJ asked "why it should be thought
reasonable to undermine a long-established and now entrenched
right." In the present case, however, the limitation itself is almost as
ancient as the right it impinges on . . .215
C.

The Views of Owen Fiss

The "rosy" way of thinking about common law adjudication that I
have ascribed to some South African jurists, some of the time, is one for
which Owen Fiss has been an eloquent and influential advocate for
going on the past quarter-century. 21 6 Professor Fiss's vision of a judicial
interpretive community, expertly working out applications of public values to social disputes, applies at least as strongly to common law as to
constitutional adjudication, and quite plausibly more strongly. (Of
course, it does not follow that Fiss is bound to argue - or in fact would
argue - in defense of every piece of ancient or recent South African
common law that has come or will come under constitutionally motivated reinspection.)
We can read the whole story condensed in a recent, ten-page essay
by Fiss on the autonomy of law.2" 7 "Law," Fiss writes, is "an autonomous sphere of human activity" serving a "panoply of values" that
includes "political freedom, individual conscience, and substantive
equality."'2 1 8 Now, Fiss does not speak here only, or even primarily, of
constitutionallaw. He cannot so be understood, because he speaks of an
activity-sphere that is autonomous, meaning it serves no master but one
alone (to which the panoply, it seems, is reducible), namely, the reasonable and rational cause of human dignity. 21 9 Among the masters explic214. Id. 1 262.
215. Id. 1 263.
216. The writings I have in mind trace back at least to Owen M. Fiss, The Forms of Justice, 93
HARV. L. REv. 1 (1979). See also Owen M. Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 1
(1986); Owen Fiss, Conventionalism, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 177 (1985); Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity
and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REv. 739 (1982).
217. Owen M. Fiss, The Autonomy of Law, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 517-26 (2001).
218. Id. at 517, 519.
219. Law serves no master, Fiss writes, save "justice," id. at 517; "human rights" have justice
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itly not served by law, in Fiss's view, is democratic politics.2 2 But a
product of politics - let us say, of politics at its best - is exactly what
South Africans understand their Constitution and its Bill of Rights to be!
Why should they not? No one I know of has a theory of the normative claim of constitutional law (as such) to bind a country's population
that makes no overt or covert reference to the constitution's political
provenance. 22 ' And anyway, today's South Africans (here they differ
from today's Americans whose demiurge Framers have receded into a
deep and misty past) have eye-witnessed their Constitution being hammered out in the political foundry - a good deal nicer place, no doubt,
than your average sausage factory,22 2 a site, no doubt, of constitutional
politics, 2 23 but still, unmistakably, a venue organized and driven by the
force of human wills pursuing their several, sometimes clashing conceptions of political morality, national interest, and maybe some crumbs of
self-interest, too. Call this view, if you will, constitutional-legal realism.
A constitutional-legal realist consciousness repeatedly finds expression
in the opinions of the South African Constitutional Court.22 4
Owen Fiss suggests no offset against such a consciousness, nor is
as their "end," id.; and "the end of human rights" also is named "the protection of human dignity,"
id. at 523. See Strydom, supra note 181, at 62 (maintaining that principles of "human dignity,
reasonableness, equity and good faith," along with those of equality and freedom, "embody the
modem idea of the law. Even in the so-called private enclave or a-constitutional sphere, these
principles [apply] .... Besides, they are indispensable for the progressive development of a legal
order on which the protection of human rights can fit comfortably.")
220. See id. at 517 (asserting that "the requirements of justice are not necessarily compatible
with democracy").
221. See Frank I. Michelman, Is the Constitution a Contract For Legitimacy?, 8 REV. CONST.
SUD. (forthcoming 2003).
222. I am thinking, of course, of the apparently undocumentable remark attributed to
Bismarck: "The making of laws is like the making of sausages - the less you know about the
process the more you respect the result." For a recent, online discussion of sources, see http://law
library.ucdavis.edu/LAWL]B/Dec02/0090.html (last visited March 5, 2004).
223. See Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/ConstitutionalLaw, 99 YALE L.J. 453
(1989).
224. For a couple of dramatic instances, see President of the Republic of South Africa v. South
African Rugby Football Union, 1999 (7) BCLR 725 (CC) 9170-76, 1999 SACLR LEXIS 18
(explaining why, in South African historical circumstances and with particular reference to the
Constitutional Court, a "reasonable apprehension" of judicial bias requiring a judge's recusal from
a case "cannot be based upon political associations or activities of judges prior to their
appointment to the bench"); Azanian Peoples Organisation (AZAPO) v. President of the Republic
of South Africa, 1996 (8) BCLR 1015 (CC) 19, 1996 SACLR LEXIS 20 (construing the Truth
and Reconciliation Act to authorize the granting of immunity against civil liability to persons
confessing to certain apartheid-era crimes, upholding the Act as thus construed against Bill of
Rights challenges by victims and their survivors, and explaining in part (but only in part) that
"[flor a successfully negotiated transition, the terms of the transition required not only the
agreement of those victimized by abuse but also those threatened by the transition ....
If the
Constitution kept alive the prospect of continuous retaliation and revenge, the agreement of those
threatened by its implementation might never have been forthcoming").
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doing so really his concern. In Fiss's view, human rights ideals, composing the sole end and being the sole master of the activity-sphere we
call law, happily may be "codified" in various positive-legal enactments.22 5 Yet what finally credentializes those ideals as worthy and true
is their recognition in a process of law that is not reducible to politics;
and what can "law" possibly signify there but the activities of judges, of
a kind we identify most closely with common law adjudication?
The judiciary at work stands apart from the rest of us, Fiss writes,
because its members have no end but justice to pursue; because the judiciary is a collective body organized specially and aptly to serve that end;
because "judges are impartial and hear grievances they might otherwise
wish to ignore;" because judges "must justify their decisions in terms of
shared principles. 2 26 For such reasons as those, adjudication, above
and beyond all other social-official practices, may and should be
regarded as a "structure of power devoted to making certain that justice
is done.

227

The point is: The encomium is to adjudication, not to any given,
political constitution. The pure case, it would seem, of adjudication
undiluted by politics is common law adjudication. Of course, we can and it seems to me Fiss does - think sometimes in terms of a fusion
between constitutional and common-law adjudication, one process taking inspiration from the other.2 28 But when we do, or Fiss does, it is the
adjudicatively "common" element as he conceives it, not the specifically
"constitutional" one, that assumes normative priority and mastership the moral-rational preceding the popular-political, the human-universal
preceding the national-particular. Fiss would have no use, normatively,
for any corpus of so-called constitution law that subordinated the pursuit
of human dignity to any other goal, principle, or value.22 9
One might hesitate to read so much into a brief essay, were it not
that the themes we identify there are continuous with those raised in
older, more elaborate Fissean writings. In his 1986 Stevens Lecture, The
Death of the Law?,2 3 0 Fiss described adjudication (he did not specifi225. Id. at 521.
226. Id. at 520.
227. Id.
228. See note 230, infra (Fiss); Harry Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional
Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973).
229. That corpus wouldn't, by the way, be South Africa's. From the beginning of its work, the
Constitutional Court has read the Bill of Rights as giving a normative centrality to the pursuit of
human dignity - as a generally guiding "value" and not just as a specifically guaranteed
entitlement or right. See, e.g., Dawood v. Minister of Home Affairs, 2000 (8) BCLR 837 (CC) U
34-35, 2000 SACLR LEXIS 147; State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) T 144, 1995
SACLR LEXIS 218.
230. Fiss, Death of the Law?, supra note 216.
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cally pick out constitutional adjudication) as "the" process for "interpreting and nurturing a public morality."'23 ' He spoke of the law (not
especially of constitutional law) as an embodiment of "shared understandings," "our public values. ''232 He accorded to the judiciary (not

specifying a constitutionaljudiciary) a special "right" to construe and
declare our public values, not on the basis of any "moral expertise"
attributed to judicial office holders but rather on the basis of the distinctive "processual norms that simultaneously constrain and liberate those

who exercise judicial power.

' 233

Fiss was referring to the insulation of

courts from ordinary politics and their commitment to a special form of
dialogue responsible to a set of disciplining rules that constitute a special

interpretive community.
Fiss is explicit that it is not, finally, constitutional texts that drive
adjudication. Rather the reverse is true. Adjudication is the container,
constitutional law the contained. It is law, in the generic sense of a
"distinctive ... form of rationality, '234 that drives and guides good constitutional interpretation. The standards for good constitutional interpretation consist of our public values and the disciplining rules of the legal
profession, and those reside in a "legal system" and a "legal culture"
231. Id. at 2.
232. Id. at 8. In The Forms of Justice, supra note 216, Fiss had written expressly of the
judiciary's special role in giving meaning to our "constitutional" values, e.g., id. at 2, 11, but that
essay as a whole conveys a usage of the term to mean a set of values equivalent to "public" values
in a less positivistic, more immanent sense. First, Fiss frequently and obviously used the two
terms interchangeably. See, e.g., id. at 14, where Fiss first wrote that "the task of a judge ...
should be seen as giving meaning to our public values" and then, one sentence later (with no
intervening explanation), wrote that "the judiciary's essential function is to give meaning to our
constitutional values." Second, Fiss denied that the content of constitutional values could be
learned from the text of the Constitution. The values, he said, are "implicit in" the clauses. Id. at

10. The clauses "contain public values," but what makes the contained values "public" isn't their
being contained in the clauses; rather, what makes them "constitutional" is their resonance with
our society's moral identity or "its distinctive public morality" as the judges construe it in the
course of applying open-textured constitutional clauses. Id. at 11. (See also Fiss, Objectivity,
supra note 216, at 751, 761-62, where Fiss wrote that the "ultimate authority" for a judicial order
in the United States is the Constitution, but then gave as a reason for the Constitution's primacy
that it embodies our fundamental public values - or ought, at any rate, be assumed to do so.)
Third, Fiss's attribution of the public-value enunciating role to the judiciary at no point, in no way,
rested on a value's prior elevation - by some act of constitutional politics, let us say - to
formally "constitutional" status. To the contrary, in Fiss's view, it was the fact of a value's having
made it through the institutional screen of adjudication that "transformed" it into something
deserving the accolade "constitutional." See Fiss, The Forms of Justice, supra at 13. It could
hardly, in his view, have been otherwise, because Fiss denied strenuously that constitutional
values become such, or can be known as such, by any fact or event of designation or acceptance
by the citizenry or the people. See id. at 12-13, 15. Finally, it was the institutions and processes
by which judges act to which Fiss attributed the transformative power of their actions. See id. at
12 and text immediately following this note.
233. Id. at 8, 11.
234. Id.at 9.
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that, competent constitutional interpreters will understand or assume,
precede and inform the constitutional text.135 You cannot tell from the
237
words of the equal protection clause whether it is Brown236 or Plessy
that gets matters right; but neither, on the other hand, is a true answer
lacking to the question. Judges can get to the truth, but only because and
insofar as they are constrained by norms that constitute the legal profession as such - the network of "disciplining rules that, like a grammar,
define and constitute the practice of judging," their authority drawn from
the tacit knowledge of "the interpretive community of which the justices
are a part. 2 3 8
We need not dwell at length on the probing essays on Conventionalism2 39 and Objectivity and Interpretation,24 0 where Fiss provides some
theoretical underpinnings for his conventionalist account of adjudication, as well as for the centrality he gives to that account in his presentation of law's normatively dominant, indispensable place (or that of "the
rule of law"24 ) in a morally well-ordered society's affairs. The two
later papers we have examined sufficiently disclose the payoff in terms
of an attitude of presumptive respect for common law adjudication such
as that coming through from many of the South African materials we
have reviewed.
I do not imagine the South African judiciary, bar, or law professoriate simply signing on to Fissean juridical conventionalism or anything
like it. I do not imagine them, individually or collectively, regarding
Fiss's claims with any lesser sense than their American cousins would
have of tension with, or contradiction of, more starkly realist understandings. What does appear to be true is that the South Africans are no
more prone and no more able than we are, individually and collectively,
to escape entirely the pull of Owen Fiss's encomium to the law - to the
law unnmodified, to the law as discipline - as an indispensable keeper
of the flame of human rights and human decency.
It is not only among the attendees at the event recorded in this
number of the University of Miami Law Review that everyone turns out
to be a student of Owen Fiss, direct or (my case) indirect. Owen's
pupils abound, we may be sure, the world over.

235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id. at 11.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
Fiss, Death of the Law?, supra note 216, at 11 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Fiss, Conventionalism, supra note 216.
Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation,supra note 216.
See Fiss, Autonomy of Law, supra note 217, at 517, 521.

